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LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)

avoid.net/lula-token-bsc-reserve-manipulation-exploit→8/100·82% conf.
[AI-DRAFTED · AWAITING FACT-CHECK]

Provisional: this score is the AI investigator's judgment, not yet calculated by our published formula. Treat it as indicative. How scoring works →

anchored·2trpYk…1yjk
last updated 2026-07-30

Summary

LULA Token (contract 0x72ad494fda63d2b91b9d7290737e8ef1194a0c47) is a BEP-20 token deployed on Binance Smart Chain that was exploited on July 29, 2026 for approximately $578,000 in a reserve manipulation attack. The attacker abused the token's recycle() function to drain the PancakeSwap V2 liquidity pair and called sync() to force reserves to attacker-controlled values, leveraging a $237 million flash loan after 12 days of on-chain preparation. Three independent blockchain security firms — TenArmor, BlockSec Phalcon, and CertiK — confirmed the exploit mechanics.

Connected Entities

3 entities · 60 linked investigations
Organizations
Tokens
♦LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)♦DLMC Token (BNB Chain Flash Loan Exploit)18
Relationships
  • DLMC Token (BNB Chain Flash Loan Exploit)→mentioned with→Binance(70%)
  • LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)→mentioned with→Binance(70%)
  • LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)→mentioned with→DLMC Token (BNB Chain Flash Loan Exploit)(80%)

Connected Through

2 shared actors · 499 investigations

Distinct actors this investigation shares with others — holders, traders, and named parties. Shared infrastructure (exchanges, pools) is excluded.

Have evidence about LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)?

Timeline(5 events)

17 July 2026

Alleged start of 12-day preparation period: attacker reportedly deployed helper contracts to accumulate referral and team rewards within the LULA protocol ahead of the exploit (per CertiK analysis).

CryptoTimes / CertiK

29 July 2026

Attacker executed the reserve manipulation exploit against the LULA token PancakeSwap V2 pair on BSC, draining approximately $578,100 using a $237 million flash loan and abusing the recycle() and claimReward() functions combined with a sync() call to commit manipulated reserves.

CryptoTimes / TenArmor / BlockSec Phalcon / CertiK

29 July 2026

TenArmor published the first public alert on X, reporting approximately $578.1K lost in a suspicious LULA token attack on BSC.

TenArmor via CryptoTimes

29 July 2026

BlockSec Phalcon published a technical breakdown of the exploit, detailing the recycle() and sync() reserve manipulation mechanism and the _basicTransfer() bypass.

BlockSec Phalcon via CryptoTimes

29 July 2026

CertiK independently confirmed the exploit, identified the $237 million flash loan, and documented the 12-day preparation period involving reward-accumulation contracts.

CertiK via CryptoTimes
Provenance & Audit Trail

Decision Log

  • #1publishRecorded on Solana ✓7/30/2026, 12:06:19 PM
    slot 443502919 · hash Gs19CXGu3zYEYfoLQrAyNhU7S6pjDJgEsy8Q9dsHGjVf

This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain (1 decision). 12 of 12 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.

model: claude-sonnet-4-6

generated: 7/30/2026, 12:06:11 PM

last updated: 7/30/2026, 12:06:11 PM

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