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LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)

avoid.net/lula-token-bsc-reserve-manipulation-exploit→8/100·82% conf.
[AI-DRAFTED · AWAITING VERIFICATION]

Summary

LULA Token (contract 0x72ad494fda63d2b91b9d7290737e8ef1194a0c47) is a BEP-20 token deployed on Binance Smart Chain that was exploited on July 29, 2026 for approximately $578,000 in a reserve manipulation attack. The attacker abused the token's recycle() function to drain the PancakeSwap V2 liquidity pair and called sync() to force reserves to attacker-controlled values, leveraging a $237 million flash loan after 12 days of on-chain preparation. Three independent blockchain security firms — TenArmor, BlockSec Phalcon, and CertiK — confirmed the exploit mechanics.

Connected Entities

1 entities · 10 linked investigations
Tokens
♦LULA Token (BSC Reserve Manipulation Exploit)
Relationships
    Also appears in
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    Timeline(5 events)

    2026-07-17

    Alleged start of 12-day preparation period: attacker reportedly deployed helper contracts to accumulate referral and team rewards within the LULA protocol ahead of the exploit (per CertiK analysis).

    CryptoTimes / CertiK

    2026-07-29

    Attacker executed the reserve manipulation exploit against the LULA token PancakeSwap V2 pair on BSC, draining approximately $578,100 using a $237 million flash loan and abusing the recycle() and claimReward() functions combined with a sync() call to commit manipulated reserves.

    CryptoTimes / TenArmor / BlockSec Phalcon / CertiK

    2026-07-29

    TenArmor published the first public alert on X, reporting approximately $578.1K lost in a suspicious LULA token attack on BSC.

    TenArmor via CryptoTimes

    2026-07-29

    BlockSec Phalcon published a technical breakdown of the exploit, detailing the recycle() and sync() reserve manipulation mechanism and the _basicTransfer() bypass.

    BlockSec Phalcon via CryptoTimes

    2026-07-29

    CertiK independently confirmed the exploit, identified the $237 million flash loan, and documented the 12-day preparation period involving reward-accumulation contracts.

    CertiK via CryptoTimes
    Provenance & Audit Trail
    11 Wayback Archives

    Decision Log

    • #1publish⛓ pending7/30/2026, 12:06:19 PM
      hash: Gs19CXGu3zYEYfoLQrAyNhU7S6pjDJgEsy8Q9dsHGjVf

    11 of 12 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.

    full audit log →version history →

    model: claude-sonnet-4-6

    generated: 7/30/2026, 12:06:11 PM

    last updated: 7/30/2026, 3:07:06 PM

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