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Audit log

Every state-changing event for K3 Capital (sBOLD vault): moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-11-22 04:11:32Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 472,402,325
    sig
    LC9NNQMeSrUC…8AAhJYPeexplorer ↗
    hash
    4mx2F1CaQST7…spmSdjTosha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (10049 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"b78ffa67-20e6-4c85-b0f2-6fb1b258a10b","kind":"publish","page_slug":"k3-capital-sbold-vault","published_at":"2026-11-22T04:11:32.713Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"K3 Capital (sBOLD vault)","sections":[{"content":"On November 18, 2026, security firm Blockaid flagged an ongoing exploit of K3 Capital's sBOLD vault on Ethereum, reporting approximately $3.43 million withdrawn across roughly 34 transactions at the time of its alert, posted at 12:50 UTC. A later on-chain reconstruction by Bitquery put the total loss at $3.42 million — described as the vault's entire balance — spread across 97 transactions executed by six wallets within about eight minutes. According to Bitquery and DefiLlama, the attacker borrowed 10,000 wstETH via a flash loan from Morpho, posted it as collateral to open a Liquity V2 trove, and minted approximately 9 million BOLD; this was used to exploit an alleged accounting discrepancy in which collateral below a configured threshold was excluded from sBOLD's share valuation. By depressing the effective share price, the attacker was able to mint sBOLD shares cheaply, then redeem them for BOLD at other depositors' expense. Bitquery reported that one wallet and an associated funded wallet retained about $520,000 of the proceeds, routing 162 ETH through THORChain and 129 ETH through Maya Protocol to Bitcoin addresses. A separate 'copycat' actor subsequently extracted a further $1.91 million across 57 transactions in a related wave, paying a large share of proceeds (reported around $1.78 million) to Ethereum block builders. Bitquery found no trove liquidations across Liquity's three markets during the incident, indicating the underlying BOLD stablecoin and Liquity's core protocol were not directly compromised; the issue was localized to K3 Capital's sBOLD wrapper.","heading":"The Exploit","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Reports $3.43M Exploit on K3 Capital's sBOLD Vault","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/blockaid-reports-3-43m-exploit-on-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault"},{"credibility":2,"name":"$3.42 million drained from K3 Capital's sBOLD vault in eight minutes","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"},{"credibility":2,"name":"K3 Capital and Reental lose nearly $3.9 million in separate DeFi exploits","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/"}]},{"content":"K3 Capital publicly stated it was investigating malicious activity and confirmed that it had paused the sBOLD vault's contracts. According to reporting, this statement was posted roughly 35 minutes after the drain had concluded, and did not include a loss figure, a root-cause explanation, or a remediation timeline. As of the most recent reporting reviewed, K3 Capital had not published a formal post-mortem, confirmed the precise vulnerability exploited, or announced any plan to compensate affected depositors. One outlet reported that K3 Capital had not responded to a request for comment at the time of publication.","heading":"K3 Capital's Response","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"$3.42 million drained from K3 Capital's sBOLD vault in eight minutes","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"},{"credibility":2,"name":"K3 Capital and Reental lose nearly $3.9 million in separate DeFi exploits","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/"}]},{"content":"sBOLD is an ERC-4626 vault that deposits the BOLD stablecoin into Liquity V2's stability pools to generate yield. Liquity's own blog describes sBOLD as a third-party product built and maintained by K3 Capital, explicitly noting that it is not part of, and is not maintained by, Liquity's core protocol team. ChainSecurity conducted a security audit of the sBOLD smart contracts dated May 19, 2025 ('the audit is dated May 19, 2025' per the report metadata), which identified a high-severity accounting issue involving collateral below a configured threshold being excluded from share valuation calculations — a mechanism similar in description to the one allegedly exploited in the November 2026 attack. That earlier finding was listed by the auditor as corrected prior to launch. It remains unconfirmed, based on available reporting, whether the November 2026 exploit reused this specific vector, exploited a reintroduced version of the same flaw, or involved a separate bug, since no outlet has confirmed which code version K3 Capital had deployed at the time of the attack.","heading":"Relationship to Liquity and Prior Audit","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"sBOLD - the on-chain DeFi savings account (Liquity blog)","type":"official","url":"https://liquity.org/blog/sbold---the-on-chain-defi-savings-account"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainSecurity K3Capital SBOLD Audit (PDF)","type":"research","url":"https://reports.chainsecurity.com/K3Capital/ChainSecurity_K3Capital_SBOLD_Audit.pdf"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainSecurity K3 sBOLD audit overview","type":"research","url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/k3-sbold"}]},{"content":"Following the initial attack, a second, unrelated actor identified and exploited the same window of vulnerability in a 'copycat' wave, extracting a further $1.91 million across 57 transactions, according to Bitquery's on-chain analysis. Reporting indicates this bot paid a substantial share of its proceeds — reported at roughly $1.78 million — to Ethereum block builders, likely as part of a priority-gas or MEV-protection arrangement, leaving the bot's net retained proceeds comparatively small relative to the gross amount extracted.","heading":"Copycat Exploitation","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"$3.42 million drained from K3 Capital's sBOLD vault in eight minutes","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Reports $3.43M Exploit on K3 Capital's sBOLD Vault","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/blockaid-reports-3-43m-exploit-on-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault"},{"credibility":2,"name":"$3.42 million drained from K3 Capital's sBOLD vault in eight minutes","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"},{"credibility":2,"name":"K3 Capital and Reental lose nearly $3.9 million in separate DeFi exploits","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"sBOLD - the on-chain DeFi savings account (Liquity blog)","type":"official","url":"https://liquity.org/blog/sbold---the-on-chain-defi-savings-account"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainSecurity K3Capital SBOLD Audit (PDF)","type":"research","url":"https://reports.chainsecurity.com/K3Capital/ChainSecurity_K3Capital_SBOLD_Audit.pdf"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ChainSecurity K3 sBOLD audit overview","type":"research","url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/k3-sbold"}],"summary":"On November 18, 2026, K3 Capital's sBOLD vault — a third-party ERC-4626 product that deposits the Liquity V2 stablecoin BOLD into Liquity's stability pools — was drained of its entire balance, reported as roughly $3.42-3.43 million, in an attack lasting about eight minutes. Attackers allegedly exploited a share-pricing accounting flaw using a large flash-loaned wstETH position to mint vault shares cheaply and redeem them for depositors' BOLD; a separate copycat bot extracted a further $1.91 million shortly after. K3 Capital paused the vault's contracts but had not published a post-mortem, root-cause confirmation, or compensation plan as of the most recent reporting.","timeline":[{"date":"2025-05-19","date_evidence":"sbold-may-19-2025 (ChainSecurity/Dedaub audit report dated May 19, 2025)","event":"ChainSecurity publishes a security audit of K3 Capital's sBOLD vault, flagging a high-severity accounting issue related to collateral valuation thresholds; findings are listed as corrected.","source":"ChainSecurity audit report","source_url":"https://reports.chainsecurity.com/K3Capital/ChainSecurity_K3Capital_SBOLD_Audit.pdf"},{"date":"2026-11","date_original":"2026-11-18","event":"Blockaid flags an ongoing exploit of the sBOLD vault at 12:50 UTC, reporting approximately $3.43 million withdrawn across roughly 34 transactions at the time of the alert.","source":"KuCoin News / Blockaid","source_url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/blockaid-reports-3-43m-exploit-on-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault"},{"date":"2026-11","date_original":"2026-11-18","event":"On-chain reconstruction indicates six wallets drained the vault's entire balance (approximately $3.42 million) across 97 transactions within about eight minutes, using a wstETH flash loan from Morpho to self-liquidate a Liquity V2 trove and manipulate sBOLD's share price.","source":"Bitquery analysis via Altcoinbuzz","source_url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"},{"date":"2026-11","date_original":"2026-11-18","event":"A copycat bot extracts a further $1.91 million across 57 transactions, paying most of the proceeds to Ethereum block builders.","source":"Bitquery analysis via Altcoinbuzz","source_url":"https://www.altcoinbuzz.io/3-42-million-drained-from-k3-capital-s-sbold-vault-in-eight-minutes"},{"date":"2026-11","date_original":"2026-11-18","event":"K3 Capital states it is investigating malicious activity and confirms the vault's contracts have been paused, without disclosing a loss figure or cause.","source":"Altcoinbuzz / crypto.news","source_url":"https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/"}]},"v":1}
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