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Glori Finance1 decision on this page

Audit log

Every state-changing event for Glori Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot taken at submission time, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-19 03:10:59Z
    Score: ?? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
    chain
    mainnet-betaslot 420,685,951
    sig
    519iUfmf3XgP…RFvwMXfPexplorer ↗
    hash
    BmqAr2kZ3ozW…8N9ornUQsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (2894 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"9ba6bead-7dc4-4357-8f41-0467afd17477","kind":"publish","page_slug":"glori-finance","published_at":"2026-05-19T03:10:58.919Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Glori Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Glori Finance was an alleged DeFi lending protocol deployed on the Arbitrum network in early 2024, operating as a Compound V2 fork with approximately $1.4 million in total value locked (TVL) at the time of its exposure. On April 14, 2024, blockchain investigator ZachXBT identified that the top GLORI token holders had seeded liquidity using funds stolen from prior scams — specifically the Crolend, Hash DAO, and HellHoundFi frauds — linking Glori Finance to a serial scam ring responsible for over $20 million in cumulative losses. Following ZachXBT's public disclosure, the Glori Finance X account was deactivated and the protocol's website went offline, consistent with an exit scam.","timeline":[{"date":"2022-01-01","event":"Solfire exit scam ($4.8 million) — alleged earliest confirmed operation by the same scam group","source":"","source_url":"https://cryptopotato.com/warning-malicious-group-threatening-layer-2-networks-exposed/"},{"date":"2023-03-01","event":"Kokomo Finance exit scam ($4–5.5 million) — alleged second major operation by the same group","source":"","source_url":"https://bitcoinist.com/kokomo-finance-pulls-exit-scam/"},{"date":"2023-08-01","event":"Magnate Finance exit scam ($6.5 million) — alleged operation by same group","source":"","source_url":"https://coingape.com/magnate-finance-deployer-exploited-17-mln-from-multiple-rug-pulls/"},{"date":"2024-01-01","event":"Crolend, Hash DAO, and HellHoundFi scams executed; stolen funds later traced as seed liquidity for Glori Finance","source":"","source_url":"https://www.coinlive.com/news/zachxbt-sounds-alarm-on-scammers-associated-with-defi-protocol"},{"date":"2024-04-14","event":"ZachXBT publishes investigation on X identifying Glori Finance (Arbitrum), Leaper Finance (Blast), and Zebra DAO (Base) as simultaneous exit scams operated by the same serial fraud group; advises users to withdraw immediately","source":"","source_url":"https://cryptopotato.com/warning-malicious-group-threatening-layer-2-networks-exposed/"},{"date":"2024-04-14","event":"Leaper Finance team taunts ZachXBT on X referencing Lazarus Group before deactivating accounts; Glori Finance X account and website go offline","source":"","source_url":"https://beincrypto.com/fraud-ethereum-layer-2-base-blast-arbitrum/"}]},"v":1}
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