Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #1[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: December 2024 SmartBridge Exploit (Incident 3)

   “On December 29, 2024, FEG's cross-chain SmartBridge was exploited for approximately $1.3 million (96.3 ETH on Ethereum, 73.3 ETH on Base, and 712 BNB on BSC)”

   reviewerDec 2024 SmartBridge exploit stole approximately $1.3 millionComponent amounts are correct, but cited sources give about $1 million, not $1.3 million (the $1.3M figure belongs to the May 2022 incident).
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   On December 29, 2024, FEG's cross-chain SmartBridge was exploited for approximately $1 million (96.3 ETH on Ethereum, 73.3 ETH on Base, and 712 BNB on BSC)
   citedwww.certik.com/resources/blog/feg-bridge…chnical-analysisprotos.com/feg-token-holders-in-despair-…-causes-99-dump/
2. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “approximately $1.3 million (96.3 ETH on ETH, 73.3 ETH on Base, 712 BNB on BSC) stolen”

   reviewerTimeline: Dec 2024 exploit stole approximately $1.3 millionSame overstated figure as in the section text.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   approximately $1 million (96.3 ETH on ETH, 73.3 ETH on Base, 712 BNB on BSC) stolen

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Migration and Recovery Attempts

   “As of early 2025, FEGex and the SmartBridge remain paused.”

   reviewerThe team reported recovering over $2 million in user funds; FEGex and SmartBridge remain paused as of early 2025No independent source found for the paused status. The page is stale on this point and does not give current (late 2026) status.
   citeddocs.feg.io/recovery/old-fegex-sd-recovery
2. #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Hotbit exchange lists FEG and FEGBSC tokens, broadening retail access.”

   reviewerHotbit listed FEG and FEGBSC on 2021-04-21No source is attached to this entry and I did not find one. Hotbit also later shut down, which the page does not mention.
3. #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Flagging

   “The on-chain investigator ZachXBT has flagged FEGex in the context of its security incidents and fund-flow analysis.”

   reviewerZachXBT flagged FEGexThe page admits this is unverified, and the cited sources are generic profiles. The whole section is speculative and should be removed or sourced.
   citeden.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZachXBTtwitter.com/zachxbt
4. #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Team Anonymity and Transparency Concerns

   “The Scam Detector platform rated fegtoken.com with a trust score of 27.5 out of 100”

   reviewerScam Detector rated fegtoken.com 27.5/100Not fetched. This is a low-tier source about the FEG token site, not FEGex itself.
   citedwww.scam-detector.com/validator/fegtoken-com-review/

A cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.

1. #12[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources

   “https://web.archive.org/web/20260829083930/https://bsc.news/post/what-is-bnb-chain-layer-one-blockchain-guide”

   reviewerArchive links for two bsc.news sources point to an unrelated pageThe archive URL is a generic BNB Chain guide, not the cited FEG article, so the original appears to redirect to junk. The same issue affects sources_used[19]. I did not fetch the live page.
   citedwww.bsc.news/post/feg-token-rallies-afte…-finance-exploit

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary

   “resulting in cumulative losses exceeding $3.6 million”

   reviewerThree exploits caused cumulative losses exceeding $3.6 millionNo source gives this total. Gross losses are roughly 1.3M + up to 2M + about 1M = about 4.3M, and the page itself says most of the Team Finance loss was returned. The figure is not derivable from the cited sources.
2. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: October 2022 Team Finance Liquidity Lock Exploit (Incident 2)

   “Team Finance was drained of a total of $14.5 million across multiple projects in the same incident.”

   reviewerTeam Finance was drained of $14.5 millionThe cited Block URL slug says $15.8M and Protos says over $15M. $14.5M is an early estimate. I did not fetch the Block article, so this correction is based on Protos only.
   citedwww.theblock.co/post/180369/hacker-uses-…rom-team-finance

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2022 Flash Loan Exploit (Incident 1)

   “resulting in a loss of approximately $1.3 million in combined assets (approximately 3,280 BNB and 144 ETH)”

   reviewerMay 15 2022 flash loan exploit about $1.3M (3,280 BNB, 144 ETH), laundered via Tornado CashAmount and laundering corroborated by Protos and the search results for the CertiK/BlockSec/Beosin analyses. Fine technical details (13 instances, 114 fBNB) were not individually checked.
   citedblocksecteam.medium.com/the-analysis-of-…ils-ea554f52bdcb
2. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2024 SmartBridge Exploit (Incident 3)

   “Security firm CertiK confirmed the vulnerability was not inherent to the Wormhole protocol itself, but resided entirely within FEG's custom implementation layer.”

   reviewerDec 2024 bridge root cause lay in FEG's code, not Wormhole; team first speculated about WormholeSupported. The claim that the audit scope excluded the issue is hedged on the page ('reportedly') and was not verified.
   citedwww.certik.com/resources/blog/feg-bridge…chnical-analysis
3. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline

   “CertiK and Halborn publish technical analyses confirming the bridge exploit was caused by flawed access control in FEG's own relay contract, not in the Wormhole protocol itself.”

   reviewerExploit date Dec 29 2024 and CertiK analysis Dec 30CertiK's write-up is dated Dec 30. The Halborn date was not verified.