Summary
FEGex is a decentralized exchange (DEX) and DeFi launchpad built around the FEG (Feed Every Gorilla) token ecosystem, operating on Ethereum and BNB Chain. The protocol has suffered three separate security exploits between 2022 and 2024, resulting in cumulative losses exceeding $3.6 million and a near-total collapse of token value following the most recent incident. The team operates anonymously and the protocol has demonstrated a repeated inability to prevent critical smart contract vulnerabilities despite multiple third-party audits.
Connected Entities
2 entities- + 1 more
Timeline(10 events)
2021-01-01
FEG (Feed Every Gorilla) token launches on Ethereum and BNB Chain; FEGex DEX and FEGexPRO swap contracts deployed.
2021-04-21
Hotbit exchange lists FEG and FEGBSC tokens, broadening retail access.
2022-05-15
FEGexPRO contracts on Ethereum and BNB Chain exploited via flash loan attack targeting swapToSwap() input validation vulnerability; approximately $1.3 million (3,280 BNB + 144 ETH) stolen. Funds laundered via Tornado Cash.
2022-05-16
CertiK and BlockSec publish independent technical postmortems on the May 15 exploit.
2022-10-01
Team Finance, a liquidity lock platform used by FEG's SmartDeFi ecosystem, is exploited for $14.5 million total; FEG-associated losses estimated at approximately $950,000–$2 million.
2022-10-30
Team Finance exploiter returns approximately $1.9 million to affected projects; FEG recovers approximately 548 ETH. FEG token price rallies ~11%.
2023-02-22
FEG token migrates to new SmartDeFi-based contract at a 1,000,000:1 ratio, consolidating FEGeth, FEGbsc, and ROX tokens. Protocol restructuring announced.
2023-03-13
FEG team secures a 200 ETH liquidity loan to replenish FEGbsc liquidity pool post-migration.
2024-12-29
FEG SmartBridge cross-chain contract exploited via Wormhole relay message spoofing vulnerability; approximately $1.3 million (96.3 ETH on ETH, 73.3 ETH on Base, 712 BNB on BSC) stolen. FEG token price collapses approximately 99%. Funds laundered via Tornado Cash.
2024-12-30
CertiK and Halborn publish technical analyses confirming the bridge exploit was caused by flawed access control in FEG's own relay contract, not in the Wormhole protocol itself.
Decision Log
- hash: G5inQDfBrJN9toSeLSa1KihaipWbdEWUchPJhauGgmvC
This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain and source URLs are archived via the Internet Archive.
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
generated: 5/4/2026, 2:54:26 AM
last updated: 5/30/2026, 4:48:02 AM
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