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← Ekubo Protocolreviewed 2026-11-17 · 13 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Ekubo Protocol against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

partially supported 4confirmed 90 corrections pending · 0 applied

partially supported

4 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
    “but the most recent (October 2026) version of that filing lists multiple unresolved disclosure gaps and records the May 2026 exploit's claims process as still open.”
    reviewerThe Blockworks filing itemizes multiple/several flagged gapsThe page omits Blockworks' own header rating (Partial, 1 gap) and describes the filing as showing multiple gaps; the filing also says it makes no malicious-control finding on the dev key. The same framing appears in sections[2].
  2. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Transparency filing: disclosure gaps and open exploit claims (October 2026)
    “However, Blockworks' own filing page for Ekubo (version 'B2 v2.2,' filed October 5, 2026, with information current as of September 29, 2026) does not display that numeric score and instead itemizes several flagged gaps”
    reviewerFiling 'does not display that numeric score' and itemizes several flagged gapsDetails all match; the missing headline rating is the only issue.
  3. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and governance structure
    “The Ekubo DAO holds on-chain ownership of the core Starknet smart contracts.”
    reviewerEkubo DAO holds on-chain ownership of the core Starknet smart contractsBroadly right but simplified; ownership is indirect for Core and Positions.
  4. #13[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
    “deployed primarily on Starknet with extensions on Ethereum and Arbitrum.”
    reviewerEkubo deployed with extensions on Ethereum and ArbitrumTrue but incomplete; Robinhood Chain (and Polygon) deployments are not mentioned.

confirmed

9 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 EVM swap router exploit (~$1.4 million)
    “The Block reported that Ekubo's core Starknet deployment and broader liquidity base were untouched, a point the article says was confirmed by StarkWare, and that Ekubo stated liquidity providers were not affected.”
    reviewerMay 2026 EVM router exploit drained about $1.4M mostly in WBTC; Starknet and LPs unaffected, confirmed by StarkWareThe Block article matches the page on amount, dates, flaw, StarkWare confirmation and LP statement.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 EVM swap router exploit (~$1.4 million)
    “The attacker ran 85 transactions that withdrew 17 WBTC from one address; SlowMist founder Cos said that user had given the Ekubo contract an unlimited approval 158 days earlier, according to ForkLog.”
    reviewer85 transactions withdrew 17 WBTC; SlowMist's Cos said unlimited approval was 158 days earlier (ForkLog)Matches ForkLog.
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 EVM swap router exploit (~$1.4 million)
    “Merkle Science's writeup, published May 11, 2026, reports the exploiter moved approximately $1.34 million worth of ETH into Tornado Cash on May 6, and separately moved about $1.36 million into the privacy protocol Railgun.”
    reviewerMerkle Science (May 11, 2026): ~$1.34M ETH to Tornado Cash on May 6; ~$1.36M into RailgunFigures match. 'Separately' slightly implies additive flows, whereas Merkle describes Railgun output feeding Tornado Cash; minor wording issue, not scored.
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 EVM swap router exploit (~$1.4 million)
    “states that, as of that filing, the May 2026 'Huff Router' incident remained open: 12 of 31 eligible addresses had claimed as of September 29, 2026, WBTC coverage was partial (about 3.97 WBTC allocated against about 17.02 WBTC identified as lost), and surviving unlimited approvals to the immutable routers remain at risk until revoked.”
    reviewerBlockworks Oct 2026 filing: Limit Orders exploit ~$55,000, 63 orders, restored Sept 21; Huff Router incident open, 12 of 31 claimed, ~3.97 vs ~17.02 WBTCFigures match the live filing.
  5. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Transparency filing: disclosure gaps and open exploit claims (October 2026)
    “An earlier version of Ekubo's filing, covered by Crypto Briefing on July 2, 2026, reported a score of 39 out of 40, and separately stated Ekubo had no relationships with centralized exchanges or market makers.”
    reviewerCrypto Briefing July 2, 2026 reported score 39/40 and no CEX/market maker relationshipsMatches.
  6. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and governance structure
    “In July 2024 the DAO approved a one-time grant of approximately $1.5 million to Ekubo, Inc., described in Ekubo's governance documentation as intended to fund the company's operations without further grant requests; no formal end date for this arrangement is stated in that documentation.”
    reviewerJuly 2024 DAO approved one-time ~$1.5M grant to Ekubo, Inc.; no end date stated in docsAccurate as scoped to the docs. The Blockworks filing adds that it was a two-year services grant.
  7. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: 2023 Uniswap DAO investment proposal
    “A non-binding Snapshot 'temperature check' on the investment was reported by The Block on October 29, 2023, as passing with about 63% of voted tokens in favor (21 million UNI for versus 12 million against).”
    reviewerOct 2023 Uniswap DAO temperature check: 3M UNI (~$12M) for 20%, ~63% for (21M vs 12M); Wintermute and Keyrock opposedMatches. Concentration of the yes vote is an optional context point.
  8. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audits and financial metrics
    “Nethermind Security reviewed the Starknet core, router, positions, and NFT contracts (dated March 22, 2024), the TWAMM extension (April 4, 2024), a revenue buyback mechanism (September 2, 2024), and the limit-orders extension (January 6, 2025)”
    reviewerAudit list (Nethermind, Plainshift, Cairo Security Clan, Code4rena, Riley Holterhus, Cantina Apex) with datesMatches. The page omits ABDK V2 audits and unnamed 2026 reviews; the Nethermind Limit Orders audit (Jan 2025) pre-dates the April 2026 Limit Orders exploit, which is worth the reader noting.
  9. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audits and financial metrics
    “As of November 17, 2026, DeFiLlama recorded Ekubo's total value locked at approximately $21.2 million, of which about $17.9 million was on Starknet.”
    reviewerDeFiLlama TVL ~$21.2M on Nov 17, 2026, ~$17.9M on StarknetMatches the DeFiLlama API.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.