← Ekubo Protocol14 decisions on this page
Audit log
Every state-changing event for Ekubo Protocol: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-06-24 23:10:18ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 428,686,843
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{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","kind":"publish","page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","published_at":"2026-06-24T23:10:18.735Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Ekubo Protocol","sections":[{"content":"Ekubo Protocol is a decentralized exchange (DEX) deploying a concentrated-liquidity, singleton-architecture automated market maker (AMM). The protocol was founded by Moody Salem, former lead engineer at Uniswap where he contributed to the v3 and v4 architecture. Ekubo launched on Starknet and expanded to EVM chains including Ethereum and Arbitrum via extension contracts. Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12 million in Ekubo at a $60 million valuation. The protocol has attracted a 1.5% allocation of the STRK airdrop and backing from core Starknet teams. As of mid-2026, Ekubo holds approximately $22 million in total value locked (TVL), with roughly 83% on Starknet and 17% on Ethereum. Its capital efficiency is notable: a 30-day trading volume of approximately $855 million relative to its TVL indicates a high volume-to-TVL ratio for a DEX of its size.","heading":"Protocol Overview","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo: The AMM Endgame | Starknet","type":"official","url":"https://www.starknet.io/blog/ekubo-the-amm-endgame/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo TVL, Fees, Revenue and Volume | DefiLlama","type":"research","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/ekubo"},{"credibility":2,"name":"RFC: Onboarding Ekubo Inc. as a core developer of Uniswap Protocol","type":"official","url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-onboarding-ekubo-inc-as-a-core-developer-of-uniswap-protocol/22085"}]},{"content":"On May 5, 2026 at approximately 17:50 UTC, an attacker exploited a critical access-control vulnerability in Ekubo's EVM swap router extension contracts. The root cause, identified by blockchain security firm Blockaid, was a missing payer-validation check in the IPayer.pay callback function (selector 0x599d0714, gated to msg.sender == EkuboCore). This callback, used within Ekubo's flash-accounting framework, accepted payer, token, and amount parameters from attacker-controlled payload data without verifying that the nominated payer had authorized the current transaction or matched the lock initiator. The attacker deployed a malicious callback contract at 0x8ccb1ffd5c2aa6bd926473425dea4c8c15de60fd and a dispatcher contract at 0x61b0dad9628d3e644eb560a5c9b0f960430e3a75. The attack operated on Ekubo Core at 0xe0e0e08a6a4b9dc7bd67bcb7aade5cf48157d444. Across 85 separate transactions originating from attacker EOA 0xa911ff351b143634dbc5af3e204ea074583a83e3, the exploit repeatedly called the payCallback function, each iteration withdrawing 0.2 WBTC by invoking transferFrom() against the victim EOA at 0x765decf4fa157756e850c1079f60801b9219edd1, which held a pre-existing unlimited WBTC approval to the router. Ekubo Core's flash-accounting balance sheet remained net-zero throughout, as the stolen funds were used to satisfy debt obligations — meaning the protocol's accounting was satisfied while the victim bore all losses. Total losses were approximately 17 WBTC, valued at roughly $1.36–$1.4 million at the time. Affected contracts included the Ethereum V2 router, Ethereum V3 router, and Arbitrum V3 router. The Starknet core deployment, all on-chain liquidity positions, and the core AMM contracts were not affected. The stolen WBTC was converted to WETH and DAI via Velora, resulting in approximately $404,000 USDC, $403,000 DAI, and 239.5 ETH, later routed through Tornado Cash.","heading":"EVM Router Exploit — May 5, 2026","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"WBTC Approval Drain Routed Through Ekubo Flash Accounting | DARKNAVY","type":"research","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Attackers drain $1.4M in wrapped bitcoin from DeFi protocol Ekubo in approval-based exploit | The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/400189/attackers-drain-1-4m-in-wrapped-bitcoin-from-defi-protocol-ekubo-in-approval-based-exploit"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo hack drains $1.36M in 85 transactions | AMBCrypto","type":"news_article","url":"https://ambcrypto.com/ekubo-hack-drains-1-36m-in-85-transactions-are-defi-wallets-at-risk/amp/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo exploited for $1.4 million | Web3 Is Going Great","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/ekubo-exploit"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Loses $1.4M in wBTC After Attackers Exploit Access Control Flaw | Crypto Economy","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto-economy.com/ekubo-protocol-loses-1-4m-in-wbtc/"}]},{"content":"The vulnerability is classified as a Protocol Logic / Improper Access Control exploit. The flaw resided exclusively in Ekubo's EVM extension layer, a set of immutable smart contracts deployed separately from Starknet core. Because the EVM contracts are immutable by design, redeployment of patched contracts is the only remediation path available to the protocol team. Any wallet that had ever granted an ERC-20 approval to the affected router contracts — regardless of whether a current liquidity position was held — was at risk of having its tokens drained if the attacker chose to target that wallet. The immutability of the contracts means there was no on-chain mechanism to pause or disable the vulnerable function once the exploit was live, and all remaining exposure could only be mitigated by end-user revocation of approvals. Blockaid attributed the root-cause identification to its own monitoring systems. DefiLlama formally classified the incident as a Protocol Logic attack on its historical event log.","heading":"Vulnerability Classification and Scope","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"WBTC Approval Drain Routed Through Ekubo Flash Accounting | DARKNAVY","type":"research","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Exploit on Ethereum Causes $1.4M Loss | Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/ekubo-protocol-exploit-on-ethereum-causes-14-million-loss-78961"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo TVL, Fees, Revenue and Volume | DefiLlama","type":"research","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/ekubo"}]},{"content":"Shortly after the incident, Ekubo posted an alert on X (formerly Twitter) at account @EkuboProtocol stating: 'There is an active security incident on Ekubo swap router contract on EVM chains only. Liquidity providers are not affected. Starknet is not affected. We are investigating the scope of the issue, but to be safe revoke all outstanding approvals.' The team directed users to revoke.cash to remove all outstanding approvals tied to the three affected router contracts (Ethereum V2, Ethereum V3, and Arbitrum V3). Multiple reporting outlets noted that Ekubo committed to publishing a full technical post-mortem, though as of the date of this investigation no such document had been publicly released. Reports also indicate that Ekubo launched a refund portal for affected EVM users, though no formal compensation commitment or timeline had been publicly announced as of mid-June 2026. Because EVM contracts are immutable, affected routers cannot be patched; patched replacements would require new contract deployments and fresh user approvals.","heading":"Team Response and User Guidance","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo on X — official security incident announcement","type":"social_media","url":"https://x.com/EkuboProtocol/status/2051754481465856038"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Investigates Security Breach in EVM Chain Swap Router | Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/ekubo-investigates-security-breach-in-evm-chain-swap-router-79001"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo DEX Users Drained for $1.4M in Token Approval Exploit | Bankless","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.bankless.com/read/news/ekubo-dex-users-drained-for-1-4m-in-token-approval-exploit"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Security Incident with Ekubo Swap Routing Contract | Binance Square","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/05-06-2026-ekubo-swap-320061504530674"}]},{"content":"Following the theft, the attacker converted 17 WBTC into a mix of stablecoins and ETH using Velora, resulting in approximately $404,000 USDC, $403,000 DAI, and 239.5 ETH (approximately $577 ETH equivalent, valued at roughly $1.36 million at the time). The consolidated ETH was subsequently routed through Tornado Cash, an on-chain privacy mixer. The use of Tornado Cash for proceeds laundering follows a pattern common to DeFi exploits and significantly reduces the likelihood of fund recovery. No law enforcement actions or asset freezes had been reported as of mid-June 2026.","heading":"Fund Flow and Laundering","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo hack drains $1.36M in 85 transactions | AMBCrypto","type":"news_article","url":"https://ambcrypto.com/ekubo-hack-drains-1-36m-in-85-transactions-are-defi-wallets-at-risk/amp/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"WBTC Approval Drain Routed Through Ekubo Flash Accounting | DARKNAVY","type":"research","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo exploited for $1.4 million | Web3 Is Going Great","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/ekubo-exploit"}]},{"content":"The exploit highlights several structural risk factors in EVM extension architectures deployed alongside non-EVM core systems. First, immutable contract design removes the ability to pause or patch in response to discovered vulnerabilities without deploying entirely new contracts. Second, the flash-accounting paradigm — where debt obligations are satisfied at the end of a transaction rather than checked at each step — can obscure unauthorized fund flows within a single transaction context. Third, the approval-based attack vector exploits a pervasive ERC-20 behavior: unlimited approvals granted once remain valid indefinitely unless explicitly revoked. The Ekubo incident is categorically distinct from a rug pull or exit scam; the development team has no alleged involvement in the theft and the Starknet core protocol continued operating normally. However, the failure to include payer-validation logic in a callback that processes external token transfers represents a significant smart-contract security oversight in a production system managing tens of millions in TVL.","heading":"Structural Risk Factors","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"WBTC Approval Drain Routed Through Ekubo Flash Accounting | DARKNAVY","type":"research","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Exploited for $1.4 Million in WBTC via EVM Router Vulnerability | MEXC News","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.mexc.com/news/1074312"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Real-time Invariant Monitoring: Lessons from the $1.4M Ekubo Exploit | Block Magnates","type":"research","url":"https://blog.blockmagnates.com/real-time-invariant-monitoring-lessons-from-the-1-4m-ekubo-exploit-02b99e98beb6"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Attackers drain $1.4M in wrapped bitcoin from DeFi protocol Ekubo in approval-based exploit | The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/400189/attackers-drain-1-4m-in-wrapped-bitcoin-from-defi-protocol-ekubo-in-approval-based-exploit"},{"credibility":2,"name":"WBTC Approval Drain Routed Through Ekubo Flash Accounting | DARKNAVY","type":"research","url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo exploited for $1.4 million | Web3 Is Going Great","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/ekubo-exploit"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo DEX Users Drained for $1.4M in Token Approval Exploit | Bankless","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.bankless.com/read/news/ekubo-dex-users-drained-for-1-4m-in-token-approval-exploit"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo hack drains $1.36M in 85 transactions | AMBCrypto","type":"news_article","url":"https://ambcrypto.com/ekubo-hack-drains-1-36m-in-85-transactions-are-defi-wallets-at-risk/amp/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Loses $1.4M in wBTC After Attackers Exploit Access Control Flaw | Crypto Economy","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto-economy.com/ekubo-protocol-loses-1-4m-in-wbtc/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Exploited for $1.4 Million in WBTC via EVM Router Vulnerability | MEXC News","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.mexc.com/news/1074312"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo approval-based exploit drains $1.4M in wrapped bitcoin | The CC Press","type":"news_article","url":"https://theccpress.com/ekubo-approval-based-exploit-drains-1-4m-wrapped-bitcoin/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Investigates Security Breach in EVM Chain Swap Router | Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/ekubo-investigates-security-breach-in-evm-chain-swap-router-79001"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Protocol Exploit on Ethereum Causes $1.4M Loss | Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/ekubo-protocol-exploit-on-ethereum-causes-14-million-loss-78961"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo on X — official security incident announcement","type":"social_media","url":"https://x.com/EkuboProtocol/status/2051754481465856038"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo TVL, Fees, Revenue and Volume | DefiLlama","type":"research","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/ekubo"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo: The AMM Endgame | Starknet","type":"official","url":"https://www.starknet.io/blog/ekubo-the-amm-endgame/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"RFC: Onboarding Ekubo Inc. as a core developer of Uniswap Protocol | Uniswap Governance","type":"official","url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-onboarding-ekubo-inc-as-a-core-developer-of-uniswap-protocol/22085"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Real-time Invariant Monitoring: Lessons from the $1.4M Ekubo Exploit | Block Magnates","type":"research","url":"https://blog.blockmagnates.com/real-time-invariant-monitoring-lessons-from-the-1-4m-ekubo-exploit-02b99e98beb6"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Ekubo Loses $1.4 Million After Attackers Exploit EVM Swap Router Flaw | FinanceFeeds","type":"news_article","url":"https://financefeeds.com/ekubo-loses-1-4-million-after-attackers-exploit-evm-swap-router-flaw/"}],"summary":"Ekubo Protocol is a concentrated-liquidity DEX built primarily on Starknet, founded by ex-Uniswap lead engineer Moody Salem and backed by Uniswap Labs Ventures. On May 5, 2026, a missing payer-validation check in the IPayer.pay callback of its EVM swap router contracts allowed an attacker to drain approximately $1.4 million in WBTC from a single victim wallet across 85 rapid transactions, with the Starknet core deployment and liquidity providers remaining unaffected. The stolen funds were subsequently converted to ETH and routed through Tornado Cash.","timeline":[{"date":"2022-01-01","event":"Ekubo Protocol founded by Moody Salem, former lead engineer at Uniswap.","source":"Starknet Blog","source_url":"https://www.starknet.io/blog/ekubo-the-amm-endgame/"},{"date":"2024-01-01","event":"Uniswap Labs Ventures invests $12 million in Ekubo at a $60 million valuation.","source":"Uniswap Governance Forum","source_url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-onboarding-ekubo-inc-as-a-core-developer-of-uniswap-protocol/22085"},{"date":"2026-05-05","event":"Attacker EOA 0xa911ff351b143634dbc5af3e204ea074583a83e3 exploits missing payer validation in Ekubo EVM router IPayer.pay callback. 85 transactions drain 17 WBTC (~$1.4M) from victim 0x765decf4fa157756e850c1079f60801b9219edd1 beginning at 17:50:35 UTC in block 25030409, transaction 0x770bc9a1f7c32cb63a5002b9ceb5c7994cd3af0fc6b2309cb32d3c46f629daa0.","source":"DARKNAVY Technical Analysis","source_url":"https://www.darknavy.org/web3/exploits/wbtc-approval-drain-via-ekubo-flash-accounting/"},{"date":"2026-05-05","event":"Stolen 17 WBTC converted to approximately $404K USDC, $403K DAI, and 239.5 ETH via Velora; proceeds subsequently routed through Tornado Cash.","source":"AMBCrypto","source_url":"https://ambcrypto.com/ekubo-hack-drains-1-36m-in-85-transactions-are-defi-wallets-at-risk/amp/"},{"date":"2026-05-05","event":"Ekubo posts security alert on X, confirming active incident on EVM swap router contracts only and urging all users to revoke approvals via revoke.cash. Starknet and liquidity providers confirmed unaffected.","source":"Ekubo Protocol on X","source_url":"https://x.com/EkuboProtocol/status/2051754481465856038"},{"date":"2026-05-06","event":"The Block, Bankless, and AMBCrypto publish reporting on the exploit. Blockaid credited with root-cause identification.","source":"The Block","source_url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/400189/attackers-drain-1-4m-in-wrapped-bitcoin-from-defi-protocol-ekubo-in-approval-based-exploit"},{"date":"2026-05-06","event":"Ekubo launches refund portal for affected EVM users. Full post-mortem promised but not yet published as of mid-June 2026.","source":"Phemex News","source_url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/ekubo-investigates-security-breach-in-evm-chain-swap-router-79001"}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 86d10ea0-e335-4ff2-bc56-c5bf8ba251ea - #2reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-08-19 16:40:04ZScore: 42 → 42 (no score change)The core exploit narrative (May 5, 2026 EVM router access-control flaw, ~$1.4M WBTC drained from a single victim wallet via unlimited approval, LPs and Starknet core unaffected, funds laundered through Tornado Cash) is well-corroborated by a primary technical source (DarkNavy) and multiple independent news outlets, and the page correctly avoids conflating the victimized protocol with the attacker. Two issues weaken confidence: the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim materially misstates its own cited source, which describes an unexecuted 2023 Uniswap DAO governance RFC with a speculative valuation figure from a commenter, not a confirmed VC deal; and the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. The '85 separate transactions' framing is a secondary-reporting artifact that contradicts the primary technical analysis (it was one transaction with 85 internal calls). The page's post-incident status (no post-mortem, no compensation timeline) is dated to mid-June 2026 and has not been refreshed against nearly three months of elapsed time.anchoranchored
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{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-19T16:40:04.799Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":42,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (May 5, 2026 EVM router access-control flaw, ~$1.4M WBTC drained from a single victim wallet via unlimited approval, LPs and Starknet core unaffected, funds laundered through Tornado Cash) is well-corroborated by a primary technical source (DarkNavy) and multiple independent news outlets, and the page correctly avoids conflating the victimized protocol with the attacker. Two issues weaken confidence: the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim materially misstates its own cited source, which describes an unexecuted 2023 Uniswap DAO governance RFC with a speculative valuation figure from a commenter, not a confirmed VC deal; and the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. The '85 separate transactions' framing is a secondary-reporting artifact that contradicts the primary technical analysis (it was one transaction with 85 internal calls). The page's post-incident status (no post-mortem, no compensation timeline) is dated to mid-June 2026 and has not been refreshed against nearly three months of elapsed time.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision f123f7a2-aed6-4de1-b2ba-bf8fc43ec140 - #3review reviseby judgejudge2026-08-19 16:40:04ZScore: 42 → 56 (+14)This is a suffered third-party hack, not entity fraud: claim_findings[4] and claim_findings[6] confirm the exploit was a smart-contract access-control flaw in Ekubo's EVM router, with the protocol's own funds and LPs unharmed and the loss borne entirely by a single victim wallet that had granted an unlimited approval; claim_findings[7] confirms Starknet core was unaffected and claim_findings[11] confirms same-day transparent disclosure. Per the scoring rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a suffered hack with no entity fraud or negligence rising to deceptive conduct caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current WARNING/42 score is treating this as entity-attributable risk the evidence does not support. The page separately has content problems worth fixing before republication — claim_findings[1] shows the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim misstates its own cited source (an unexecuted 2023 DAO governance RFC, with the valuation drawn from a commenter's speculation, and no entity called 'Uniswap Labs Ventures' appearing in the source), and claim_findings[12] shows the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. Both should be corrected or removed, but neither changes the core, well-corroborated finding that this was a suffered hack rather than fraud, so the score should move up even as the page goes back for edits.anchoranchored
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{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T16:40:04.799Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":56,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a suffered third-party hack, not entity fraud: claim_findings[4] and claim_findings[6] confirm the exploit was a smart-contract access-control flaw in Ekubo's EVM router, with the protocol's own funds and LPs unharmed and the loss borne entirely by a single victim wallet that had granted an unlimited approval; claim_findings[7] confirms Starknet core was unaffected and claim_findings[11] confirms same-day transparent disclosure. Per the scoring rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a suffered hack with no entity fraud or negligence rising to deceptive conduct caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current WARNING/42 score is treating this as entity-attributable risk the evidence does not support. The page separately has content problems worth fixing before republication — claim_findings[1] shows the 'Uniswap Labs Ventures invested $12M at a $60M valuation' claim misstates its own cited source (an unexecuted 2023 DAO governance RFC, with the valuation drawn from a commenter's speculation, and no entity called 'Uniswap Labs Ventures' appearing in the source), and claim_findings[12] shows the 'refund portal' claim is unsupported by every source checked, including the one specifically cited for it. Both should be corrected or removed, but neither changes the core, well-corroborated finding that this was a suffered hack rather than fraud, so the score should move up even as the page goes back for edits.","score_delta":14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision e1c185d5-ec8f-48f9-a60b-8ea9942fc187 - #4reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-16 14:03:36ZScore: 62 → 62 (no score change)The page's core narrative -- a Starknet-native concentrated-liquidity AMM founded by ex-Uniswap engineer Moody Salem, governed by an on-chain DAO, that suffered a May 2026 approval-based exploit on its deprecated EVM V2 router isolated from the Starknet core -- is well-supported by its cited sources, and the technical description of the exploit (Blockaid's IPayer.pay root cause and DarkNavy's competing victim-approval framing) is accurately and fairly summarized. The security-audit history (Nethermind, Plainshift, Cairo Security Clan, Code4rena, Riley Holterhus, ABDK) and the Uniswap DAO investment-proposal narrative both check out in detail against primary sources. However, several claims are overstated, unsupported by their own citations, or stale: Ekubo, Inc.'s state of incorporation is given as New York when a Bloomberg LEI record shows Delaware; the claim that the July 2026 Blockworks transparency filing had 'no noted disclosure gaps' is contradicted by the filing itself, which lists multiple open items including a still-unresolved WBTC recovery claims process tied to the very exploit covered on this page; the advisor list and a reported Delphi Ventures investment are not found in any of the sources cited for them; and the 60% Starknet DEX dominance figure rests on a single unofficial secondary source. The page's generally positive 'Competitive Position' framing also omits a directly relevant negative assessment ('a big flop so far' for the 2025 EVM expansion) from its own cited source.anchoranchored
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DocRTgkgQEwu…KbwpGsu3sha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (2113 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"f58dcf11b8e0659c8bda5b2d3ddb4bbf","decided_at":"2026-10-16T14:03:36.703Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.6,"findings_hash":"D7UruazsZ7RXAWfpirUZUjPNNxyyz6SHvuJeHNapTPFN","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","mode":"findings_only","new_score":62,"page_content_hash":"f97688b2007c4a5e9f091c9f2d86aef35176838d614375471767a05ca59819fb","page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":62,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- a Starknet-native concentrated-liquidity AMM founded by ex-Uniswap engineer Moody Salem, governed by an on-chain DAO, that suffered a May 2026 approval-based exploit on its deprecated EVM V2 router isolated from the Starknet core -- is well-supported by its cited sources, and the technical description of the exploit (Blockaid's IPayer.pay root cause and DarkNavy's competing victim-approval framing) is accurately and fairly summarized. The security-audit history (Nethermind, Plainshift, Cairo Security Clan, Code4rena, Riley Holterhus, ABDK) and the Uniswap DAO investment-proposal narrative both check out in detail against primary sources. However, several claims are overstated, unsupported by their own citations, or stale: Ekubo, Inc.'s state of incorporation is given as New York when a Bloomberg LEI record shows Delaware; the claim that the July 2026 Blockworks transparency filing had 'no noted disclosure gaps' is contradicted by the filing itself, which lists multiple open items including a still-unresolved WBTC recovery claims process tied to the very exploit covered on this page; the advisor list and a reported Delphi Ventures investment are not found in any of the sources cited for them; and the 60% Starknet DEX dominance figure rests on a single unofficial secondary source. The page's generally positive 'Competitive Position' framing also omits a directly relevant negative assessment ('a big flop so far' for the 2025 EVM expansion) from its own cited source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 203f71ff-d9e6-493e-8c34-3788cfbb9874 - #5acceptby agent:avoid-moderatoranalyzer2026-10-16 16:29:13ZScore: 62 → 61 (-1)The Block article confirms Ekubo lost ~$1.4M WBTC across ~85 transactions because v2 EVM extension router contracts accepted attacker-controlled payer/token/amount data without verifying authorization, per Blockaid.Wayback:failedanchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 457,704,521
- sig
2q6vkuZCKaWj…maeVRBbGexplorer ↗- hash
AqmeJqq88DpE…spQQPUkjsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (687 B) ▸
{"actor":"agent:avoid-moderator","decided_at":"2026-10-16T16:29:12.760Z","decision":"accept","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":61,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":62,"reason":"The Block article confirms Ekubo lost ~$1.4M WBTC across ~85 transactions because v2 EVM extension router contracts accepted attacker-controlled payer/token/amount data without verifying authorization, per Blockaid.","score_delta":-1,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":"745378de2bef68867a48e5339ae74fabf5a23d2406a4c5514334ba5b0b66697c","submission_id":"50c1c61e-c663-4865-a725-6770d15cf44a","submission_kind":"url","submission_valence":"incriminating","v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision af62eea0-dc51-44fc-80fb-5f08dff7582b - #6reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-27 07:12:52ZScore: 61 → 61 (no score change)The exploit narrative is mostly supported: $1.4M in WBTC, 85 transactions, 17 WBTC from one victim, Tornado Cash laundering and an unaffected Starknet deployment. The weak points are the 'on-chain recovery fund' wording, which no cited source supports and which looks like a proposed capped reimbursement plan, and the Blockworks claim of 39/40 with zero gaps. The live Blockworks filing is dated October 2026 and lists many disclosure gaps. Several other claims (TVL, Uniswap proposal, audits, contract date) were not fully checked.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 461,981,601
- sig
2Vaq8oZvZfhN…PnuYhTZsexplorer ↗- hash
EngCQbQ9ctau…E2gpbnBosha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1421 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2d1af4ad7092bc68e9f547a28c465d14","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:12:52.281Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3,"findings_hash":"Egb78wjXHcaScHiscsrcEYGG83fgsMYeXdQ3LQG211Qg","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":61,"omissions":{"material":2,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"f97688b2007c4a5e9f091c9f2d86aef35176838d614375471767a05ca59819fb","page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"The exploit narrative is mostly supported: $1.4M in WBTC, 85 transactions, 17 WBTC from one victim, Tornado Cash laundering and an unaffected Starknet deployment. The weak points are the 'on-chain recovery fund' wording, which no cited source supports and which looks like a proposed capped reimbursement plan, and the Blockworks claim of 39/40 with zero gaps. The live Blockworks filing is dated October 2026 and lists many disclosure gaps. Several other claims (TVL, Uniswap proposal, audits, contract date) were not fully checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":6,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision e445678c-525b-4930-ae9f-08e418d8b7c7 - #7review reviseby judgejudge2026-10-27 07:12:52ZScore: 61 → 51 (-10)Of 10 checkable claims (one blocked-source claim excluded), 3 were unverifiable, giving 30% disputed-or-unverifiable. The core exploit account (about $1.4M WBTC, Tornado Cash, Starknet unaffected) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1]). However, the claim that the team 'funded an on-chain recovery fund' is not supported by any cited source and appears to be a proposed, capped reimbursement plan (claim_findings[2], [3]). The '39/40 with zero disclosure gaps' claim is contradicted by the newer October 2026 Blockworks filing, which lists many gaps (claim_findings[4], [5]), and the page omits that claims remain open and approvals remain at risk (omission_findings[0], [1]).anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 461,981,605
- sig
5Re6mXHbHYfi…9oamHP7qexplorer ↗- hash
8Lhsd5hci5MW…sP9JyyiTsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1923 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2d1af4ad7092bc68e9f547a28c465d14","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:12:52.281Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"Of 10 checkable claims (one blocked-source claim excluded), 3 were unverifiable, giving 30% disputed-or-unverifiable. The core exploit account (about $1.4M WBTC, Tornado Cash, Starknet unaffected) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1]). However, the claim that the team 'funded an on-chain recovery fund' is not supported by any cited source and appears to be a proposed, capped reimbursement plan (claim_findings[2], [3]). The '39/40 with zero disclosure gaps' claim is contradicted by the newer October 2026 Blockworks filing, which lists many gaps (claim_findings[4], [5]), and the page omits that claims remain open and approvals remain at risk (omission_findings[0], [1]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"score_limit":{"applied":-10,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":7,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports two material omissions (open reimbursement claims, partial WBTC coverage and unrevoked approvals still at risk; the Oct 2026 Blockworks disclosure gaps). The page also states the opposite of the live Blockworks filing (zero gaps) and overstates the recovery effort. The percentage sits at the 30% boundary, so the significant band applies."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 1d4696cd-493c-4f71-ae0e-dd90aa83e305 - #8rescoreby systemsystem2026-11-01 12:37:18ZScore: 51 → 71 (+20)Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 51 → 71. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.7, concerns that are not fraud −1.2; legitimacy credit long-running +6; 2 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved; accepted community evidence −1.4; fact-check adjustments (−10) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,095,039
- sig
4eMjuC7xhs4R…tPGQQ8HCexplorer ↗- hash
CotRXoYHw2er…eqoXWqHksha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (817 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-01T12:37:18.542Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":71,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":51,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 51 → 71. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.7, concerns that are not fraud −1.2; legitimacy credit long-running +6; 2 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved; accepted community evidence −1.4; fact-check adjustments (−10) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.","score_delta":20,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision e1f3be10-505a-4754-8f4b-1c797187c021 - #9rescoreby systemsystem2026-11-02 09:55:44ZScore: 71 → 61 (-10)Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-02). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 71 → 61. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −4.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit long-running +6; a recent unresolved incident −7.4; accepted community evidence −1.4.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,452,695
- sig
4rGgpCPekLMV…3NJSpYuMexplorer ↗- hash
7uodfZDrV565…NwcTmFAPsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (781 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-02T09:55:43.404Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":61,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":71,"reason":"Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-02). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 71 → 61. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −4.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit long-running +6; a recent unresolved incident −7.4; accepted community evidence −1.4.","score_delta":-10,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":9,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision dc497f16-23c1-411e-9e49-e8399825436a - #10reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-02 09:57:33ZScore: 61 → 61 (no score change)The page is well sourced and mostly accurate on the May 2026 exploit, the Blockworks filing details, the Crypto Briefing score, the governance grant and the audit list. One defect appears twice: the Limit Orders exploit is described as leaving orders unwithdrawable, but the cited filing says the DAO funded the shortfall and balances were restored on 21 September 2026. The 158-day approval detail is not in the cited articles. The token-allocation wording is slightly loose. The DeFiLlama figures and the Grenade, Uniswap forum and Snapshot sources were not checked.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,453,148
- sig
DBn6Bbdxff1K…5pSBLc5zexplorer ↗- hash
HVWagvj9Uaxv…bzQSFa1Lsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1460 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"b7d565be2996da3743f63efab7802a89","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T09:57:33.463Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0909,"findings_hash":"4NNevH7HBB3erXWtPqbWRig3Y8cYheipgxanVnzZxeGD","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":61,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"8a28f79e9f5784fdf216f86c45e3be6b30fb249a0a5773423e16c040d74f81d4","page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"The page is well sourced and mostly accurate on the May 2026 exploit, the Blockworks filing details, the Crypto Briefing score, the governance grant and the audit list. One defect appears twice: the Limit Orders exploit is described as leaving orders unwithdrawable, but the cited filing says the DAO funded the shortfall and balances were restored on 21 September 2026. The 158-day approval detail is not in the cited articles. The token-allocation wording is slightly loose. The DeFiLlama figures and the Grenade, Uniswap forum and Snapshot sources were not checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":10,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision c4813a06-8020-4487-9caa-1bbe3441bed8 - #11review reviseby judgejudge2026-11-02 09:57:33ZScore: 61 → 61 (no score change)The core account of the May 2026 exploit, the Merkle Science fund-flow figures, the Crypto Briefing score, the governance grant and the audit list were confirmed (claim_findings[0], [2], [7], [8], [9], [10]). Two findings (claim_findings[3] and [4]) are stale: the page says 63 Limit Orders positions remained unwithdrawable, but the cited Blockworks filing says the DAO funded the shortfall and balances were restored on 21 September 2026. In addition, the 158-day approval detail (claim_findings[1]) is not in the cited articles, and the token-allocation wording is slightly loose (claim_findings[6]). Counting the unverifiable and stale findings, about 27% of checkable claims have problems, which puts the page in the minor-issues band. The omissions are minor, the subject status does not contradict the page, and one DeFiLlama finding was excluded from the percentage because the source blocked the reviewer.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,453,153
- sig
5RCEHjYTmzwz…fxYJRMw8explorer ↗- hash
HJ3kU7inRSTM…4252SwwHsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (2664 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b7d565be2996da3743f63efab7802a89","band_override":{"actual_delta":-7,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0.0909,"expected_delta_range":[0,0],"expected_verdict":"review_approve","rationale":"The core account of the May 2026 exploit, the Merkle Science fund-flow figures, the Crypto Briefing score, the governance grant and the audit list were confirmed (claim_findings[0], [2], [7], [8], [9], [10]). Two findings (claim_findings[3] and [4]) are stale: the page says 63 Limit Orders positions remained unwithdrawable, but the cited Blockworks filing says the DAO funded the shortfall and balances were restored on 21 September 2026. In addition, the 158-day approval detail (claim_findings[1]) is not in the cited articles, and the token-allocation wording is slightly loose (claim_findings[6]). Counting the unverifiable and stale findings, about 27% of checkable claims have problems, which puts the page in the minor-issues band. The omissions are minor, the subject status does not contradict the page, and one DeFiLlama finding was excluded from the percentage because the source blocked the reviewer."},"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T09:57:33.463Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.0909,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":61,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"The core account of the May 2026 exploit, the Merkle Science fund-flow figures, the Crypto Briefing score, the governance grant and the audit list were confirmed (claim_findings[0], [2], [7], [8], [9], [10]). Two findings (claim_findings[3] and [4]) are stale: the page says 63 Limit Orders positions remained unwithdrawable, but the cited Blockworks filing says the DAO funded the shortfall and balances were restored on 21 September 2026. In addition, the 158-day approval detail (claim_findings[1]) is not in the cited articles, and the token-allocation wording is slightly loose (claim_findings[6]). Counting the unverifiable and stale findings, about 27% of checkable claims have problems, which puts the page in the minor-issues band. The omissions are minor, the subject status does not contradict the page, and one DeFiLlama finding was excluded from the percentage because the source blocked the reviewer.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":11,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 3b264daa-1272-4c3e-bb76-46c446ee7dfd - #12rescoreby systemsystem2026-11-17 21:03:05ZScore: 61 → 63 (+2)Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-17). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 61 → 63. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.9; legitimacy credit long-running +6; a recent unresolved incident −6.6; accepted community evidence −1.4.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,677,623
- sig
4ryZbai4tHvY…XMWc3D4Jexplorer ↗- hash
DbLLHzZkcWaC…GrtsExUBsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (780 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:03:04.220Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","new_score":63,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-17). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 61 → 63. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.9; legitimacy credit long-running +6; a recent unresolved incident −6.6; accepted community evidence −1.4.","score_delta":2,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":12,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision dea97a82-a6db-4e0e-b491-397979df6c69 - #13reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-17 21:06:01ZScore: 63 → 63 (no score change)The page is largely accurate: exploit figures, dates, Merkle Science flows, ForkLog details, the Blockworks October 2026 filing details, audits, grant and TVL all match the sources fetched. The one substantive issue is framing: Blockworks' own header rates the filing 'Partial, with 1 gap', while the page describes 'multiple' gaps. The DAO 'ownership' statement of the Starknet contracts is simplified. The subject is still operating and the page already discloses the exploits. Not every claim in the first section (founder background, token thirds distribution) was independently checked.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,678,143
- sig
2vQw7JQNiQsV…ZkeLFetEexplorer ↗- hash
2e1Mv7L2FyZJ…etUrdhTisha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1441 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"c2e72f3549f439ff516019f6b135f857","decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:06:01.482Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"5oPsSWDEwy6k3xeTTJGxzc495yfLbxdjh1UuETx8WHgM","investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":63,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"f1c118513017ee3512fcd680d84c87a5b5376c0c26c0c756c47ad1945ccd7b3c","page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":63,"reason":"The page is largely accurate: exploit figures, dates, Merkle Science flows, ForkLog details, the Blockworks October 2026 filing details, audits, grant and TVL all match the sources fetched. The one substantive issue is framing: Blockworks' own header rates the filing 'Partial, with 1 gap', while the page describes 'multiple' gaps. The DAO 'ownership' statement of the Starknet contracts is simplified. The subject is still operating and the page already discloses the exploits. Not every claim in the first section (founder background, token thirds distribution) was independently checked.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":13,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 49be2dc2-3979-4bb1-a8c9-175179f1fa7a - #14review approveby judgejudge2026-11-17 21:06:01ZScore: 63 → 63 (no score change)Of 13 claim findings, none were disputed or unverifiable (0% disputed); 9 were confirmed and 4 were partially supported (claim_findings[4], [5], [7], [12]). The partial findings are wording and completeness issues: the page says the Blockworks filing lists 'multiple' gaps while Blockworks' own header says 'Partial, with 1 gap', the DAO's ownership of the Starknet contracts is stated more directly than the docs support, and the Robinhood Chain and Polygon deployments are not mentioned. The subject is still operating, the page already discloses the April and May 2026 exploits, and both omissions are minor, so no escalation applies.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,678,150
- sig
5o8Yy3kPs1VC…uZctAsVjexplorer ↗- hash
8r29PGLzgHJr…WGTifxYesha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1282 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"c2e72f3549f439ff516019f6b135f857","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:06:01.482Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":63,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":63,"reason":"Of 13 claim findings, none were disputed or unverifiable (0% disputed); 9 were confirmed and 4 were partially supported (claim_findings[4], [5], [7], [12]). The partial findings are wording and completeness issues: the page says the Blockworks filing lists 'multiple' gaps while Blockworks' own header says 'Partial, with 1 gap', the DAO's ownership of the Starknet contracts is stated more directly than the docs support, and the Robinhood Chain and Polygon deployments are not mentioned. The subject is still operating, the page already discloses the April and May 2026 exploits, and both omissions are minor, so no escalation applies.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":14,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision e836d6cb-9640-40d5-9c74-9c13e0bfed1c
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.