Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read DEUS Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
1 claimNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Practices and Repeated Vulnerability
“a cross-check of OFAC SDN, SEC EDGAR and CFTC enforcement databases found no matching actions.”
reviewerNo regulatory or law-enforcement action identified; OFAC/SEC/CFTC cross-check found nothingSearches surfaced no regulatory action, but the page cites no source for the database cross-check and I did not query those databases directly.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #2[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Exploit 2: April 2022 Flash-Loan Price Manipulation (~$13.4 Million, Fantom)
“The primary attack transaction on Fantom, documented by Crypto Briefing,”
reviewerApril 2022 exploit drained about $13.4 million via a ~$143M USDC flash loan buying 9.5M DEI; 71,000 DEI borrowed 17.2M DEICore figures match CoinDesk; the 800 ETH Tornado funding and the tx hash were not verified from the fetched source. - #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Practices and Repeated Vulnerability
“As of data through mid-2025, the DEUS token continued to trade on secondary markets at a small fraction of its all-time high of about $1,128, and the protocol's TVL had declined substantially from peak levels.”
reviewerCurrent status relies on data through mid-2025; protocol TVL merely declinedToken trading holds, but current TVL is $0, which is more than 'declined substantially'. Page's data is about 15 months old. Fetch of DefiLlama not done directly.
confirmed
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exploit 1: March 2022 Flash-Loan Oracle Manipulation (~$3 Million, Fantom)
“Security firm PeckShield estimated the direct theft at about $3 million (200,000 DAI and 1,101.8 ETH) and noted that total protocol losses could be larger.”
reviewerMarch 2022 exploit stole about $3 million (200,000 DAI and 1,101.8 ETH), attacker funded via Tornado Cash and proceeds routed back through Tornado CashCoinDesk matches amounts, date and laundering path. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exploit 3: May 2023 DEI Contract Implementation Bug (~$6–7 Million)
“CertiK noted that it had audited DEUS Finance's AMM product in June 2021, but the DEI stablecoin contract containing the bug was outside that audit's scope.”
reviewerMay 2023 DEI exploit root cause was reversed allowance parameters in burnFrom; CertiK audited the AMM in June 2021, DEI contract out of scopeBug description and audit scope match. Per-chain split ($5M Arbitrum, $1.3M BSC, $135K Ethereum) was not confirmed from CertiK. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“with combined reported losses of roughly $22–23 million”
reviewerSummary aggregate: three exploits with combined losses of roughly $22-23 million$3M + $13.4M + ~$6-6.5M = ~$22.4-22.9M. Arithmetic is consistent with the section figures.