← DEUS Finance4 decisions on this page
Audit log
Every state-changing event for DEUS Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-05-20 22:36:27ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 421,077,028
- sig
3GgdKSRgEhb5…WEGCz7oBexplorer ↗- hash
2Syur4EB45dp…o5U4CUissha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (5984 B) ▸
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"8d65bcd5-e167-485e-a817-609b36d70291","kind":"publish","page_slug":"deus-finance","published_at":"2026-05-20T22:36:27.940Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"DEUS Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://bitcoinist.com/deus-finance-the-next-generation-multi-asset-defi-protocol/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/deus-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.crunchbase.com/person/lafayette-tabor"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/03/15/derivatives-platform-deus-finance-exploited-for-3m-on-fantom-network"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/137817/deus-finance-dao-suffers-3-million-flash-loan-attack"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/deus-finance-suffers-3m-oracle-exploit/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/04/28/how-deus-finance-was-exploited-for-134m-on-fantom"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.theblock.co/linked/143969/deus-finance-flash-loan-exploit-nets-hacker-13-million"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/defi-hacker-steals-13-4m-deus-finance-attack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://therecord.media/more-than-13-million-stolen-from-defi-platform-deus-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/stablecoin-stumble-the-code-bug-led-to-usd6-5-million-loss-on-deus-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://crypto.news/deus-finance-hacked-over-6m-dei-stablecoin-stolen/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/deus-finance-exploited-for-13-4-million-in-the-second-hack-in-two-months"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/defi-hacker-steals-13-4m-deus-finance-attack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/defi-platform-deus-suffers-second-exploit-in-2-months-a-18988"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://quillaudits.medium.com/decoding-deus-dao-6-5-million-exploit-quillaudits-588bbecec61f"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/03/15/derivatives-platform-deus-finance-exploited-for-3m-on-fantom-network"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/deus-finance-loses-6m-following-stablecoin-hack"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://crypto.news/deus-finance-hacked-over-6m-dei-stablecoin-stolen/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/stablecoin-stumble-the-code-bug-led-to-usd6-5-million-loss-on-deus-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/04/28/how-deus-finance-was-exploited-for-134m-on-fantom"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptopotato.com/deus-finance-exploited-twice-in-two-months-over-13-million-stolen/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://beincrypto.com/deus-finance-dao-hack-13-million-less-than-60-days/"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"DEUS Finance is a decentralized derivatives and synthetic asset protocol built primarily on Fantom, co-founded by Lafayette Tabor and Mohammad Abrishami. The protocol suffered three separate security exploits between March 2022 and May 2023, resulting in combined losses exceeding $22 million across flash loan oracle attacks and a smart contract implementation flaw, with stolen funds routed through Tornado Cash in the 2022 incidents. Repeated security failures across distinct vulnerability classes raise severe concerns about the protocol's security practices and long-term viability.","timeline":[{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"First exploit: Flash loan attack manipulates Muon oracle on Fantom via USDC/DEI pool price data; approximately $3 million stolen (200,000 DAI and 1,101.8 ETH). Funds laundered through Tornado Cash.","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"Lafayette Tabor deactivates affected contracts and pledges reimbursement via smart contract funded by personal and DAO reserves.","source":""},{"date":"2022-04-28","event":"Second exploit: A second flash loan oracle manipulation attack on Fantom drains approximately $13.4 million. Attacker borrows $143 million in a flash loan, artificially inflates DEI price, borrows additional capital against inflated collateral. Tx hash: 0x39825ff84b44d9c9983b4cff464d4746d1ae5432977b9a65a92ab47edac9c9b5. Funds bridged to Ethereum and laundered via Tornado Cash.","source":""},{"date":"2022-04-28","event":"DEUS token price drops approximately 16.5% within 24 hours. Team states loss falls on protocol, not individual users; pauses DEI lending.","source":""},{"date":"2023-05-05","event":"Third exploit: A burnFrom parameter reversal bug in the DEI stablecoin contract is exploited across Arbitrum (~$5M), BNB Smart Chain (~$1.3M), and Ethereum (~$135K), totaling approximately $6.38–$6.5 million. DEI depegs to approximately $0.20.","source":""},{"date":"2023-05-07","event":"DEUS Finance announces partial white-hat recovery of approximately 5.5 million out of 7 million DEI-equivalent tokens. Recovered funds placed in a 2/3 multisig managed by @lafachief and Yearn Finance contributors. All affected contracts paused and subsequently destroyed.","source":""}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 9f4040ed-6b61-4e81-8d98-332cb54c04b6 - #2rescoreby systemsystem2026-10-10 18:49:09ZScore: 10 → 53 (+43)Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 10 → 53. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −9.6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8; legitimacy credit long-running +2.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 455,369,162
- sig
2p63TRRMMstd…CXxwaeT6explorer ↗- hash
EM2TpnGBLr24…7NoSKjw5sha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (643 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-10T18:49:09.562Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"8d65bcd5-e167-485e-a817-609b36d70291","new_score":53,"page_slug":"deus-finance","prev_score":10,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 10 → 53. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −9.6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8; legitimacy credit long-running +2.","score_delta":43,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision dd7d5ae4-597a-4fde-9102-e67bc18b72b7 - #3reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-27 19:07:23ZScore: 53 → 53 (no score change)The core exploit narrative (March 2022 ~$3M, April 2022 ~$13.4M, May 2023 ~$6.5M burnFrom bug, Tornado Cash laundering, CertiK audit scope) matches the sources I fetched. Details I could not confirm from fetched sources include the 800 ETH Tornado funding, the per-chain May 2023 split, the OFAC/SEC/CFTC cross-check and the recovery multisig. The current-status section is stale (TVL is now $0). The prose has leftover editorial references to a 'survivor page' and 'merged page'.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 462,183,223
- sig
476n3yyy9bqq…EbQoVkwUexplorer ↗- hash
13qzVYV6kQvG…NDYtQtGmsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1330 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"a79da3618a234ed17768e28a0a53a419","decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:07:23.438Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1667,"findings_hash":"9kz41fQtid48YQJwS2pZ5SKr3pPyDttdnynnWzykCCVJ","investigation_id":"8d65bcd5-e167-485e-a817-609b36d70291","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":53,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"e0c811ffaf35d6a23adc06f0ec690edd90a73488bfe110d49ee5a0608c67d5b3","page_slug":"deus-finance","prev_score":53,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (March 2022 ~$3M, April 2022 ~$13.4M, May 2023 ~$6.5M burnFrom bug, Tornado Cash laundering, CertiK audit scope) matches the sources I fetched. Details I could not confirm from fetched sources include the 800 ETH Tornado funding, the per-chain May 2023 split, the OFAC/SEC/CFTC cross-check and the recovery multisig. The current-status section is stale (TVL is now $0). The prose has leftover editorial references to a 'survivor page' and 'merged page'.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 2202dced-4ed4-42f6-9681-9eb96251cecb - #4review reviseby judgejudge2026-10-27 19:07:23ZScore: 53 → 53 (no score change)The core account of the three exploits (March 2022 about $3M, April 2022 about $13.4M, May 2023 about $6.5M) matches CoinDesk and CertiK (claim_findings[0], [1], [2], [3]). One of six claims (16.7%) could not be verified: the OFAC/SEC/CFTC cross-check cites no source (claim_findings[4]). The Current Status section is out of date, since DefiLlama now shows $0 TVL rather than a decline (claim_findings[5]), and some details in the April 2022 and May 2023 sections were not confirmed. The penalty is at the mild end of the minor band because the main allegations hold up and the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.5).anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 462,183,228
- sig
51fsKCuYaKki…5GALRkapexplorer ↗- hash
x8ZaaKdPWfKX…uMYT1Hazsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1265 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"a79da3618a234ed17768e28a0a53a419","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:07:23.438Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"8d65bcd5-e167-485e-a817-609b36d70291","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":53,"page_slug":"deus-finance","prev_score":53,"reason":"The core account of the three exploits (March 2022 about $3M, April 2022 about $13.4M, May 2023 about $6.5M) matches CoinDesk and CertiK (claim_findings[0], [1], [2], [3]). One of six claims (16.7%) could not be verified: the OFAC/SEC/CFTC cross-check cites no source (claim_findings[4]). The Current Status section is out of date, since DefiLlama now shows $0 TVL rather than a decline (claim_findings[5]), and some details in the April 2022 and May 2023 sections were not confirmed. The penalty is at the mild end of the minor band because the main allegations hold up and the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.5).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 567b12ff-6b2e-4441-9531-97a0f279d62e
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.