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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Curve LlamaLend: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-29 02:41:16Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"b20a5ebe-152f-4198-9df6-0987e1950faf","kind":"publish","page_slug":"curve-llamalend","published_at":"2026-05-29T02:41:16.120Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Curve LlamaLend","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://resources.curve.finance/lending/overview/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-llamalend","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.curve.finance/lending/overview/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://mixbytes.io/blog/modern-defi-lending-protocols-how-its-made-curve-llamalend","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-ceo-clarifies-uwu-hack-misinformation","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-suffers-massive-liquidations","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://protos.com/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-hit-amid-22m-crv-liquidation-cascade/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/232464/curve-finance-ceo-michael-egorov-wife-mansions-australia","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://nulltx.com/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://x.com/CurveFinance/status/2028427216401342496","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://phemex.com/news/article/curve-investigates-attack-on-sdola-llamalend-market-63826","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.mexc.com/news/840010","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://crypto.news/crv-price-llamalend-exploit-sentiment-support-2026/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/04/27/curve-founder-pitches-market-based-fix-for-usd700k-bad-debt-in-contrast-to-aave-bailout","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://crypto.news/curves-new-bad-debt-pools-turn-losses-into-tradable-claims/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blockonomi.com/curve-finance-launches-recovery-path-for-affected-crv-long-llamalend-market-lenders/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/398958/better-than-bailouts-curve-founder-proposes-market-based-bad-debt-recovery-model-for-defi-lending-amid-kelpdao-fallout","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.panewslab.com/en/articles/019dcc94-42ea-752e-9aab-1c988b2be01f","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/28/stake-dao-assures-users-after-vsdcrv-exploit-and-bridge-shutdown/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402719/security-researchers-flag-ongoing-stakedao-exploit-vsdcrv","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cryptobriefing.com/stake-dao-exploit-vsdcrv-arbitrum/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://crypto.news/stake-dao-exploit-update-key-products-unaffected-bridge-closed/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://invezz.com/news/2026/05/27/arbitrum-based-stakedao-contract-hit-by-5-4t-vsdcrv-exploit/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/curve-finance-liquidity-pool-hack/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/01/curve-finances-62m-exploit-exposes-larger-issues-for-defi-ecosystem/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blockworks.com/news/curve-suffers-exploit","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.bitget.com/academy/curve-finance-hack","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.llamarisk.com/research/curve-lending","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://llamarisk.com/research/defi-money-risk-parameterization","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.ccn.com/analysis/crypto/curve-llamallend-founder-innovation/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://resources.curve.finance/crvusd/loan-concepts/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2120482","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.curve.finance/assets/pdf/audits/ChainSecurity_Curve_Curve_Stablecoin_audit_250221.pdf","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/curve-stablecoin","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/michael-egorov-promises-to-develop-curve-amid-accusations-of-elaborate-cash-out","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/232464/curve-finance-ceo-michael-egorov-wife-mansions-australia","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://fintelegram.com/curve-ceo-michael-egorov-and-his-lavish-australian-villas/","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Curve LlamaLend (also referred to as the crvUSD lending markets) is a decentralized, permissionless isolated lending protocol built by Curve Finance that allows users to borrow crvUSD against crypto collateral using the LLAMMA soft-liquidation mechanism. The protocol has experienced multiple distinct incidents since launch: a $10 million bad-debt event in June 2024 tied to the founder's oversized leveraged positions, an oracle-manipulation attack on the sDOLA market in March 2026 resulting in approximately $240,000 in borrower losses, an October 2025 market crash that left the CRV-long vault approximately $700,000 underbacked, and a May 2026 third-party exploit (Stake DAO) that forced the sunsetting of an associated Arbitrum LlamaLend market. The protocol's core contracts have not been directly compromised by a code-level hack, but recurring bad-debt events, oracle design flaws in permissionlessly created markets, and governance concentration risks have drawn sustained scrutiny including a flag from on-chain investigator ZachXBT.","timeline":[{"date":"2023-07-30","event":"Curve Finance liquidity pools exploited via Vyper compiler reentrancy bug (versions 0.2.15, 0.2.16, 0.3.0); initial losses estimated at ~$70M, ultimately ~$52M after white-hat recoveries. LlamaLend not yet deployed.","source":""},{"date":"2024-04-13","event":"Statemind releases pre-launch audit of LlamaLend, identifying 1 Critical, 1 High, and 4 Medium vulnerabilities — all reportedly remediated before deployment.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-13","event":"CRV drops ~28–30% following the UwU Lend exploit. Curve founder Michael Egorov's $95.7M in stablecoin debt backed by ~47% of CRV supply is liquidated across five platforms. LlamaLend CRV market accrues $10M in bad debt.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-15","event":"Michael Egorov announces full repayment of the $10M LlamaLend bad debt, funded in part by a $6M USDT sale of 30M CRV to NextGen Venture Partners.","source":""},{"date":"2024-12-19","event":"Egorov liquidated again for 918,830 CRV (~$882,000) as CRV falls more than 12% in 24 hours, per CoinDesk reporting.","source":""},{"date":"2025-10-10","event":"Broad market crash — attributed in part to tariff announcement — triggers $19B in global leveraged liquidations. LlamaLend CRV-long market accrues approximately $700,000 in bad debt as gas spikes prevent timely liquidations; lender vault drops to ~70% solvency.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-02","event":"sDOLA–crvUSD LlamaLend market exploited via flash-loan oracle manipulation attack. Attacker profits ~$240,000; borrowers in the market are liquidated; lenders unaffected. Curve Finance confirms investigation on X.","source":""},{"date":"2026-04-27","event":"Michael Egorov proposes permissionless market-based bad-debt recovery pool for the October 2025 CRV-long LlamaLend bad debt, centered at 71% solvency, as an alternative to bailout mechanisms.","source":""},{"date":"2026-05-27","event":"Stake DAO exploited on Arbitrum; attacker mints 5.4 trillion vsdCRV via compromised deployer key. Actual losses limited to ~$91,000. The Arbitrum asdCRV LlamaLend market is sunset; crvUSD depositors directed to migrate.","source":""}]},"v":1}
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  2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-06-10 00:03:12Z
    Score: 52 → 52 (no score change)
    The investigation page's factual claims are largely accurate and well-grounded: all major incident dates, dollar figures, and mechanism descriptions are corroborated by tier-1 sources or contemporaneous reporting. The one unverifiable claim — a specific flag by ZachXBT directed at Curve LlamaLend — has no corroborating source across multiple searches. The one partially-supported claim (June 15 repayment date) has the core facts confirmed but the specific date could not be independently verified due to a 404 on the cited CoinTelegraph URL. A significant structural gap exists in that all section content fields are empty, leaving the full page structure unreviewed.
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    {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-10T00:03:12.128Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"b20a5ebe-152f-4198-9df6-0987e1950faf","new_score":52,"page_slug":"curve-llamalend","prev_score":52,"reason":"The investigation page's factual claims are largely accurate and well-grounded: all major incident dates, dollar figures, and mechanism descriptions are corroborated by tier-1 sources or contemporaneous reporting. The one unverifiable claim — a specific flag by ZachXBT directed at Curve LlamaLend — has no corroborating source across multiple searches. The one partially-supported claim (June 15 repayment date) has the core facts confirmed but the specific date could not be independently verified due to a 404 on the cited CoinTelegraph URL. A significant structural gap exists in that all section content fields are empty, leaving the full page structure unreviewed.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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  3. #3review approveby judgejudge
    2026-06-10 00:03:12Z
    Score: 52 → 52 (no score change)
    The review assessed 16 claims and found 14 confirmed, 1 partially supported, and 1 unverifiable — yielding a disputed_pct of 6.25%, within the 0–10% approval band. The one unverifiable claim (claim_findings[6]: a ZachXBT flag directed at Curve LlamaLend) appears in the summary as a supporting detail with no corroborating source, but it is not a core allegation and does not affect the accuracy of the incident record. The one partially-supported claim (claim_findings[10]: June 15 repayment date) has all material facts confirmed by Tier 1 sources; only the specific date is unverifiable due to a 404 on the cited CoinTelegraph URL. Two high-priority coverage gaps exist — the governance concentration claim lacks quantitative support, and all nine section content fields are empty — but gaps indicate areas for expansion rather than grounds for denial under platform policy.
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    {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-10T00:03:12.128Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"b20a5ebe-152f-4198-9df6-0987e1950faf","new_score":52,"page_slug":"curve-llamalend","prev_score":52,"reason":"The review assessed 16 claims and found 14 confirmed, 1 partially supported, and 1 unverifiable — yielding a disputed_pct of 6.25%, within the 0–10% approval band. The one unverifiable claim (claim_findings[6]: a ZachXBT flag directed at Curve LlamaLend) appears in the summary as a supporting detail with no corroborating source, but it is not a core allegation and does not affect the accuracy of the incident record. The one partially-supported claim (claim_findings[10]: June 15 repayment date) has all material facts confirmed by Tier 1 sources; only the specific date is unverifiable due to a 404 on the cited CoinTelegraph URL. Two high-priority coverage gaps exist — the governance concentration claim lacks quantitative support, and all nine section content fields are empty — but gaps indicate areas for expansion rather than grounds for denial under platform policy.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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    python -m src.verify_decision 47c671d6-639b-41a3-b1a6-16c2b4a2b463
  4. #4rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-10-10 18:50:47Z
    Score: 52 → 40 (-12)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 52 → 40. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −12.8, the subject's own conduct −8, incidents the subject suffered −6.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.6; legitimacy credit long-running +4.
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    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-10T18:50:47.150Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"b20a5ebe-152f-4198-9df6-0987e1950faf","new_score":40,"page_slug":"curve-llamalend","prev_score":52,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 52 → 40. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −12.8, the subject's own conduct −8, incidents the subject suffered −6.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.6; legitimacy credit long-running +4.","score_delta":-12,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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  5. #5reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-16 23:00:40Z
    Score: 40 → 40 (no score change)
    The page's core incident narrative -- the June 2024 Egorov liquidation and $10M bad debt, the March 2026 sDOLA oracle manipulation, the October 2025 CRV-long bad debt and Egorov's April 2026 recovery-pool proposal, the May 2026 Stake DAO/vsdCRV exploit, and the July 2023 Vyper background -- is substantially well-sourced and checks out against independent reporting, often down to specific dollar and percentage figures (e.g., the $700K/70%-backed/71%-solvency figures and the $19B tariff-crash liquidation figure are all precisely confirmed). However, the review surfaced several concrete defects: a likely-fabricated or at minimum uncited attribution to ZachXBT; a citation misattributed to CoinDesk that is actually The Block, bundled with a causal claim (borrowed proceeds funding the mansions) not supported by that source; a dead/wrong-slug thedefiant.io URL whose correct live version turns out to be a June 2024 article, not the 'April 2026' accusations the page describes; an unsupported and internally-contradicted claim that the 2023 Vyper exploit caused the 2024 bad-debt cascade; a disputed 47%-of-supply figure that none of the page's own sources support; two dead mirror-site citations in the sDOLA section (working replacements identified); and a systemic 404 pattern across all resources.curve.finance/docs.curve.finance citations. None of these defects reverse the page's overall risk characterization, but several (especially the ZachXBT attribution and the CoinDesk/Block misattribution) are the kind of checkable, specific errors that should be corrected before the next publish cycle.
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    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"ed7340a8c28370a1eab416172fb2b7ea","decided_at":"2026-10-16T23:00:40.648Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"7obpSdAKtGnhjWgMtBXPGjA5fgyi74YgCs7njVkesrx2","investigation_id":"b20a5ebe-152f-4198-9df6-0987e1950faf","mode":"findings_only","new_score":40,"page_content_hash":"73f0816c74e81af795a7b0b5906ec6d211cafc6f40723ed64ad52b69bc5516b6","page_slug":"curve-llamalend","prev_score":40,"reason":"The page's core incident narrative -- the June 2024 Egorov liquidation and $10M bad debt, the March 2026 sDOLA oracle manipulation, the October 2025 CRV-long bad debt and Egorov's April 2026 recovery-pool proposal, the May 2026 Stake DAO/vsdCRV exploit, and the July 2023 Vyper background -- is substantially well-sourced and checks out against independent reporting, often down to specific dollar and percentage figures (e.g., the $700K/70%-backed/71%-solvency figures and the $19B tariff-crash liquidation figure are all precisely confirmed). However, the review surfaced several concrete defects: a likely-fabricated or at minimum uncited attribution to ZachXBT; a citation misattributed to CoinDesk that is actually The Block, bundled with a causal claim (borrowed proceeds funding the mansions) not supported by that source; a dead/wrong-slug thedefiant.io URL whose correct live version turns out to be a June 2024 article, not the 'April 2026' accusations the page describes; an unsupported and internally-contradicted claim that the 2023 Vyper exploit caused the 2024 bad-debt cascade; a disputed 47%-of-supply figure that none of the page's own sources support; two dead mirror-site citations in the sDOLA section (working replacements identified); and a systemic 404 pattern across all resources.curve.finance/docs.curve.finance citations. None of these defects reverse the page's overall risk characterization, but several (especially the ZachXBT attribution and the CoinDesk/Block misattribution) are the kind of checkable, specific errors that should be corrected before the next publish cycle.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision e8515035-7be1-468a-938b-152e7429d8b2
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.