← Cheil Credit Bankreviewed 2026-09-06 · 27 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Cheil Credit Bank against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
7 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2017-09-21”
reviewerPresident Trump signed Executive Order 13810 on September 21, 2017.The Executive Order's official text and the November 2025 Federal Register notice both date the order September 20, 1917 -> 2017, not September 21.Proposed correction (not yet applied)2017-09-20 - #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Connections to Illicit Finance Platforms
“Huione Pay and Huione Guarantee — designated by FinCEN in May 2025 as primary money laundering concerns under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act — processed at least $37.6 million in digital assets following DPRK-attributed heists.”
reviewerHuione Pay and Huione Guarantee were designated by FinCEN in May 2025 as primary money laundering concerns under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act.FinCEN's formal Section 311 special measure barring Huione from the U.S. financial system was finalized October 15, 2025 (effective Nov 17, 2025); May 2025 was only the proposed rulemaking stage. The article the page cites for this claim is itself about the October action.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Huione Pay and Huione Guarantee — barred by FinCEN in a final rule effective November 17, 2025, following a May 2025 notice of proposed rulemaking finding them primary money laundering concerns under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act — processed at least $37.6 million in digital assets following DPRK-attributed heists. - #11[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2025-05”
reviewerFinCEN's designation of Huione Group occurred in May 2025.The final Section 311 rule barring Huione took effect via an October 15, 2025 final rule (effective Nov 17, 2025); the May 2025 action was a proposed rulemaking, not the designation described by the cited source.Proposed correction (not yet applied)2025-10-15 - #12[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“FinCEN designates Huione Group as a primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Cheil Credit Bank cryptocurrency addresses show on-chain exposure to Huione Pay and Huione Guarantee.”
reviewerFinCEN 'designates' Huione Group as a primary money laundering concern (May 2025 timeline event).Same underlying date/characterization error as the timeline date field and section 6 prose.Proposed correction (not yet applied)FinCEN's final rule barring Huione Group under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act takes effect, following a May 2025 notice of proposed rulemaking. Cheil Credit Bank cryptocurrency addresses show on-chain exposure to Huione Pay and Huione Guarantee. - #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Designated Individuals
“representatives of Koryo Commercial Bank, Ryugyong Commercial Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, and the Central Bank of the DPRK”
reviewerThe five additional individuals designated alongside Cheil Credit Bank on Nov 4, 2025 were representatives of Koryo Commercial Bank, Ryugyong Commercial Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, and the Central Bank of the DPRK.Per the primary Federal Register notice, Ho Yong Chol is linked to Korea Daesong Bank, not any of the four institutions the page lists; Ryugyong Commercial Bank does not appear in the designation at all for this group.Proposed correction (not yet applied)representatives of Korea Daesong Bank, Koryo Commercial Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, and the Central Bank of the DPRK - #18[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Broader DPRK Cybercrime Context
“with Elliptic estimating North Korea-linked actors stole more than $2 billion in 2025 alone — a 51% year-over-year increase”
reviewerElliptic estimated North Korea-linked actors stole more than $2 billion in 2025 alone, a 51% year-over-year increase.The $2 billion figure is Elliptic's, but the 51% YoY increase attributed to Elliptic in the same sentence appears to actually be a Chainalysis statistic; Elliptic's own article describes a much larger 'almost triple' increase.Proposed correction (not yet applied)with Elliptic separately estimating North Korea-linked actors stole more than $2 billion in 2025 alone, a figure Chainalysis later put at $2.02 billion — a 51% year-over-year increase - #20[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: DPRK IT Worker Revenue Pipeline
“OFAC estimated the IT worker scheme generated nearly $800 million in 2024 alone across the broader DPRK program.”
reviewerOFAC estimated the DPRK IT worker scheme generated nearly $800 million in 2024 alone across the broader DPRK program.None of the section's four cited sources contain this figure; it originates from an unrelated, later (March 2026) OFAC action against a different IT-worker fraud network.Proposed correction (not yet applied)A separate March 2026 OFAC sanctions action estimated a related DPRK IT-worker fraud network generated nearly $800 million in 2024.
stale
3 claimsThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #21[stale][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“also known as First Credit Bank and formerly as Kyongyong Credit Bank”
reviewerCheil Credit Bank is formerly known as Kyongyong Credit Bank (summary).The 'formerly known as' framing was accurate before November 2025 but was superseded by the same Nov 4, 2025 SDN update the page describes, which now lists Kyongyong Credit Bank as a current a.k.a., not a former name.Proposed correction (not yet applied)also known as First Credit Bank and Kyongyong Credit Bank - #22[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Institutional Background
“and was formerly known as Kyongyong Credit Bank”
reviewerCheil Credit Bank was formerly known as Kyongyong Credit Bank (institutional background section).Same underlying defect as the summary occurrence.Proposed correction (not yet applied)and also known as Kyongyong Credit Bank - #23[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Institutional Background
“Its SWIFT code KYCBKPPY (Kyongyong Credit Bank Pyongyang) reflects its former name.”
reviewerThe SWIFT code KYCBKPPY reflects the bank's former name (Kyongyong Credit Bank Pyongyang).Consistent with the same reclassification defect.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Its SWIFT code KYCBKPPY (Kyongyong Credit Bank Pyongyang) reflects this alias.
link rot
1 claimA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #27[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://web.archive.org/web/20260726230523/https://unblock.federalregister.gov/”
reviewerThe Federal Register source URL and its archived snapshot preserve the actual November 17, 2025 OFAC notice.The live federalregister.gov URL itself redirects automated fetches to a bot-challenge page, and the stored Wayback Machine capture preserved that challenge page rather than the notice; the govinfo.gov PDF is a working, content-bearing mirror of the same document.Proposed correction (not yet applied)https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-17/pdf/2025-19924.pdf
partially supported
4 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: OFAC Sanctions Status
“On November 4, 2025, OFAC substantially expanded the SDN record by appending 53 cryptocurrency addresses — primarily USDT (TRC-20) addresses on the Tron blockchain — to the bank's listing, marking the largest single crypto-address expansion for any DPRK-designated financial entity.”
reviewerOn November 4, 2025, OFAC added 53 USDT (TRC-20)/Tron addresses to Cheil Credit Bank's SDN listing, described as the largest single crypto-address expansion for any DPRK-designated financial entity.The core facts (date, count, chain/token) are confirmed by the primary Federal Register notice. The superlative claim that this is the largest such expansion 'for any DPRK-designated financial entity' is not made by any cited source and could not be independently verified. - #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Cryptocurrency Addresses and Financial Flows
“According to on-chain analysis by TRM Labs and Elliptic, the collective inbound flows to these wallets exceeded $12.7 million in USDT between June 2023 and May 2025.”
reviewerTRM Labs and Elliptic on-chain analysis found collective inbound flows to the 53 addresses exceeded $12.7 million between June 2023 and May 2025.The $12.7 million figure is well corroborated (TRM Labs, Treasury-derived press coverage), but joint attribution to Elliptic specifically could not be confirmed from Elliptic's own published figures. - #24[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Institutional Background
“According to 38 North's 2016 and 2017 surveys of DPRK financial institutions, the bank had authorized capital of approximately $14 million and is believed to be affiliated with the Workers' Party of Korea.”
reviewerAccording to 38 North's 2016/2017 surveys, the bank had authorized capital of approximately $14 million and is believed affiliated with the Workers' Party of Korea.The figure exists in the cited source but is drawn from 38 North's Kyongyong Credit Bank entry, which the source itself lists as a separate institution from First Credit Bank/Cheil Credit Bank (different address, phone); the page's attribution to Cheil Credit Bank relies entirely on treating Kyongyong Credit Bank as the same entity, an identification 38 North does not itself make. - #25[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Institutional Background
“Historical records indicate the bank may have managed a merger between Sintak Euhaeng (an investment trust bank) and Korea Joint Venture Bank.”
reviewerHistorical records indicate the bank may have managed a merger between Sintak Euhaeng (an investment trust bank) and Korea Joint Venture Bank.Already appropriately hedged ('may have'); same sourcing caveat as the authorized-capital claim applies.
confirmed
12 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Sanctions Status
“The bank was first designated on September 26, 2017, pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13810, which President Trump issued in response to North Korea's September 2017 nuclear test and ballistic missile tests.”
reviewerCheil Credit Bank was first designated by OFAC on September 26, 2017 under E.O. 13810 for operating in North Korea's financial services sector.Corroborated directly from the November 17, 2025 Federal Register notice, which recites the bank's original E.O. 13810 designation. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Sanctions Status
“Japan followed with its own designation on November 7, 2017, and Australia added Cheil Credit Bank to its DPRK Sanctions Regime beginning December 1, 2023.”
reviewerJapan designated Cheil Credit Bank on November 7, 2017, and Australia added it to its DPRK sanctions regime beginning December 1, 2023.Both dates match the OpenSanctions consolidated sanctions record. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: OFAC Sanctions Status
“The Federal Register published formal notice of this action on November 17, 2025.”
reviewerThe Federal Register published formal notice of the November 4, 2025 action on November 17, 2025.Confirmed directly against the primary document text. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cryptocurrency Addresses and Financial Flows
“At the time of designation, the total combined balance across the 53 addresses was approximately $5.4 million.”
reviewerThe total combined balance across the 53 addresses at time of designation was approximately $5.4 million.Confirmed by both cited analytics firms. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cryptocurrency Addresses and Financial Flows
“Of the 53 designated addresses, 26 had already been blocklisted by Tether prior to the OFAC action, representing funds frozen during a large-scale Tether blocklisting operation in late April and May 2025.”
reviewer26 of the 53 designated addresses had already been blocklisted by Tether prior to the OFAC action, in a large-scale blocklisting operation in late April and May 2025.Directly confirmed by TRM Labs and Elliptic reporting. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Designated Individuals
“Both are described in U.S. Treasury and State Department materials as managing funds, including approximately $5.3 million in cryptocurrency, on behalf of Cheil Credit Bank (referred to in U.S. official documents as First Credit Bank).”
reviewerJang Kuk Chol and Ho Jong Son were designated for managing approximately $5.3 million in cryptocurrency on behalf of Cheil/First Credit Bank.Confirmed by both the Treasury press release and the primary Federal Register SDN notice. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Connections to Illicit Finance Platforms
“processed at least $37.6 million in digital assets following DPRK-attributed heists”
reviewerHuione Pay and Huione Guarantee processed at least $37.6 million in digital assets following DPRK-attributed heists.Dollar figure independently confirmed; only the designation date attached to it (addressed separately) is disputed. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Connections to Illicit Finance Platforms
“Xinbi Guarantee, a Chinese-language Telegram-based escrow and money laundering platform that processed over $19.9 billion in on-chain volume between 2021 and 2025, also appears in the exposure chain”
reviewerXinbi Guarantee processed over $19.9 billion in on-chain volume between 2021 and 2025.Figure matches independent reporting on Xinbi, though note this figure became widely publicized alongside a later (2026) UK sanctions action rather than at the time of the Cheil Credit Bank designation. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Broader DPRK Cybercrime Context
“The February 2025 Bybit exchange hack, attributed by the FBI to Lazarus Group (also known as TraderTraitor and APT38), resulted in the theft of approximately $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency, making it the single largest crypto heist on record.”
reviewerThe February 2025 Bybit hack, resulting in ~$1.5 billion stolen, was attributed by the FBI to Lazarus Group/TraderTraitor/APT38, making it the largest crypto heist on record.Fully corroborated by FBI's own public statement. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Broader DPRK Cybercrime Context
“DPRK cyber actors have stolen more than $3 billion in cryptocurrency over a three-year period ending 2025”
reviewerDPRK cyber actors have stolen more than $3 billion in cryptocurrency over a three-year period ending 2025.Matches Treasury's own stated rationale for the November 2025 action. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Broader DPRK Cybercrime Context
“Chainalysis reported DPRK attacks in 2025 accounted for 76% of all crypto service compromises by value, achieved with 74% fewer known attack incidents than prior years — indicating increasingly targeted, high-yield operations.”
reviewerChainalysis reported DPRK attacks in 2025 accounted for 76% of all crypto service compromises by value, with 74% fewer known attack incidents than prior years.All three statistics independently confirmed via multiple outlets covering the same Chainalysis report. - #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Institutional Background
“Cheil Credit Bank (SWIFT/BIC: KYCBKPPY) operates under aliases including First Credit Bank and First Trust Bank Corporation”
reviewerCheil Credit Bank's SWIFT/BIC is KYCBKPPY, and it operates under aliases including First Credit Bank and First Trust Bank Corporation.SWIFT/BIC and First Credit Bank alias both confirmed directly from the primary Federal Register SDN text; First Trust Bank Corporation alias corroborated by OpenSanctions and 38 North.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.