Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and Overview

   “The project raised approximately $18.7 million through an ICO on Binance Launchpad in March 2019, issuing the native ANKR token (ERC-20, capped at 10 billion tokens) at $0.0067 per token.”

   reviewerAnkr raised approximately $18.7 million through an ICO on Binance Launchpad in March 2019, at $0.0067 per token.Multiple independent sources place Ankr's token sale in 2018 (public sale Sept 2018), sold directly as an Ethereum ICO, not via Binance Launchpad (which launched its first IEO in Jan 2019, after Ankr's sale had concluded). The $18.7M aggregate figure is plausible (close to Coincodex's reported total) but the page misattributes it to a March 2019 Binance Launchpad sale.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   The project raised approximately $18.7 million across private and public token sale rounds that concluded with a public sale in September 2018 (not a Binance Launchpad offering), issuing the native ANKR token (ERC-20, capped at 10 billion tokens); the public tranche was priced at approximately $0.0066 per token.
   citedkriptomat.io/cryptocurrencies/ankr/what-is-ankr/www.ankr.com/
2. #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “ANKR token launched via ICO on Binance Launchpad, raising approximately $18.7 million.”

   reviewerANKR token launched via ICO on Binance Launchpad, raising approximately $18.7 million (timeline, dated 2019-03).Same underlying error as the Background section: wrong date and wrong platform for the ICO.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   ANKR token ICO (private and public rounds) concluded, raising approximately $18.7 million; the sale was not conducted via Binance Launchpad.
3. #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “2019-03”

   reviewerANKR token ICO occurred in March 2019 (timeline date field).The stored date field, not just the prose, needs correcting to reflect the actual sale date.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   2018-09
4. #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Cascading Impact: Helio Protocol and HAY Stablecoin Depeg

   “Helio subsequently repurchased and burned approximately 15 million HAY to restore the peg to near $0.99.”

   reviewerHelio subsequently repurchased and burned approximately 15 million HAY to restore the peg to near $0.99.The page appears to conflate the $15 million (USD) Ankr/Helio committed to the buyback with a claim that 15 million HAY tokens were repurchased and burned, and overstates the recovery price. Contemporaneous reporting (including the page's own cited Cointelegraph source) shows recovery to roughly $0.96, and documented repurchase volumes in the single-digit millions of HAY, not 15 million.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   Helio and Ankr committed roughly $15 million toward repurchasing HAY on the open market to restore the peg, which had recovered to approximately $0.96 as of mid-December 2022 reporting.
   citedcointelegraph.com/news/ankr-deploys-15m-…rs-after-exploit

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and Overview

   “In 2020, Ankr launched its Stkr liquid staking protocol, which later evolved into a suite of BNB Chain-based staking derivatives including aBNBc (Ankr Reward Bearing Staked BNB) and ankrBNB.”

   reviewerIn 2020, Ankr launched its Stkr liquid staking protocol, which evolved into aBNBc and ankrBNB.Could not independently confirm the specific 2020 launch date or the 'Stkr' product name from current sources; neither cited source states this either. Not contradicted, just unconfirmed.
   citedkriptomat.io/cryptocurrencies/ankr/what-is-ankr/www.ankr.com/
2. #21[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Flagging

   “The specific basis for ZachXBT's flag of Ankr has not been independently verified in publicly available posts reviewed during this investigation.”

   reviewerAVOID.NET has flagged this entity based on investigative tracking by ZachXBT, though the specific basis for the flag has not been independently verified.The page itself appropriately hedges this claim as unverified. Both cited sources are generic landing pages rather than a specific post about Ankr, so the underlying flag cannot be independently confirmed. This is a pre-existing unverifiable claim correctly flagged as weak by the page's own text, not a new error.
   citedzachxbt.mirror.xyz/medium.com/@investigationsbyzachxbt

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and Overview

   “Ankr operates a globally distributed network of bare-metal servers acting as nodes for over 75 blockchains, providing RPC endpoints and APIs.”

   reviewerAnkr operates nodes providing RPC endpoints and APIs for over 75 blockchains.Both of the page's own cited sources give a different count than '75' (70+ on ankr.com, 40+ on kriptomat.io). The claim is in the right range but not precisely supported by either citation.
   citedwww.ankr.com/
2. #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “The attacker minted approximately 60 trillion aBNBc tokens across six transactions and proceeded to swap them on PancakeSwap and other decentralized exchanges, extracting approximately $5 million in USDC before on-chain liquidity was exhausted.”

   reviewerThe attacker minted approximately 60 trillion aBNBc tokens across six transactions and extracted approximately $5 million in USDC.The 60-trillion figure matches Ankr's own primary-source after-action report (the cited source), but independent press accounts range from 20 trillion to six quadrillion, so this is the company's own self-reported figure rather than an independently verified number.
   citedwww.ankr.com/blog/after-action-report-ou…c-token-exploit/
3. #13[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Cascading Impact: Helio Protocol and HAY Stablecoin Depeg

   “One attacker purchased 183,885 aBNBc tokens for approximately 10 BNB (~$2,800) and used them as collateral to borrow 16 million HAY, which was then swapped for approximately $15.5 million BUSD. A second address executed the same strategy and extracted approximately $3.5 million.”

   reviewerA Helio Protocol attacker purchased 183,885 aBNBc tokens for approximately 10 BNB (~$2,800), borrowed 16 million HAY, and swapped it for approximately $15.5 million BUSD; a second address extracted approximately $3.5 million.The dollar figures ($15.5M, $3.5M, ~10 BNB) are well corroborated. The precise token count (183,885 vs. the commonly reported 183,384.92) is a minor discrepancy likely due to rounding/snapshot differences across sources, not a substantive error.
   citedrekt.news/ankr-helio-rektwww.cryptotimes.io/2022/12/03/helio-prot…er-ankr-exploit/

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Overview

   “Ankr was founded in 2017 by Chandler Song, Ryan Fang, and Stanley Wu.”

   reviewerAnkr was founded in 2017 by Chandler Song, Ryan Fang, and Stanley Wu.Founders and founding year are corroborated by independent sources outside the page's own citations.
   citedkriptomat.io/cryptocurrencies/ankr/what-is-ankr/www.ankr.com/
2. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “On December 1-2, 2022, Ankr suffered a critical security breach attributed to a former team member. According to Ankr's official post-mortem, the attacker conducted a supply chain attack combined with social engineering, inserting malicious code into a software update package.”

   reviewerOn December 1-2, 2022, a former team member conducted a supply chain attack combined with social engineering that extracted Ankr's deployer private key.Directly confirmed by Ankr's primary-source post-mortem.
   citedwww.ankr.com/blog/after-action-report-ou…c-token-exploit/cointelegraph.com/news/ankr-confirms-exp…ate-trading-halt
3. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “With access to the deployer key (address 0x2ffc59d32a524611bb891cab759112a51f9e33c0), the attacker deployed a new malicious version of the aBNBc token contract that added an unauthorized minting function (function selector 0x3b3a5522), bypassing all caller verification checks.”

   reviewerThe attacker used deployer key address 0x2ffc59d32a524611bb891cab759112a51f9e33c0 and deployed a malicious contract with mint function selector 0x3b3a5522.Both the deployer address and function selector were independently corroborated.
   citedrekt.news/ankr-helio-rektwww.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-an…-of-ankr-exploit
4. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “On-chain security firm PeckShield flagged the exploit at approximately 12:35 UTC on December 2, 2022.”

   reviewerPeckShield flagged the exploit at approximately 12:35 UTC on December 2, 2022.Matches the cited source directly.
   citedcointelegraph.com/news/ankr-confirms-exp…ate-trading-halt
5. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “The aBNBc token price fell approximately 99.5% from roughly $303 to $1.53 within hours of the attack.”

   reviewerThe aBNBc token price fell approximately 99.5% from roughly $303 to $1.53 within hours.Independently corroborated by a security-firm analysis using CoinMarketCap pricing data.
   citedcointelegraph.com/news/ankr-confirms-exp…ate-trading-halt
6. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2022 Private Key Compromise and aBNBc Exploit

   “The attacker (address 0xf3a465c9fa6663ff50794c698f600faa4b05c777) bridged proceeds via Celer and deBridgeGate to Ethereum and routed approximately 3,360 ETH through Tornado Cash across multiple transactions. An additional 900 BNB was sent through Tornado Cash separately. Approximately 1,000 BNB remained at an address associated with a prominent centralized exchange at the time of reporting.”

   reviewerApproximately 3,360 ETH was routed through Tornado Cash; an additional 900 BNB was sent through Tornado Cash separately; approximately 1,000 BNB remained at a CEX-associated address.Directly matches the cited on-chain analysis, including the exact attacker address.
   citedwww.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-an…-of-ankr-exploit
7. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cascading Impact: Helio Protocol and HAY Stablecoin Depeg

   “HAY stablecoin depegged, reaching a low of approximately $0.20 before partially recovering.”

   reviewerHAY stablecoin depegged, reaching a low of approximately $0.20 before partially recovering.Confirmed by CoinDesk/CoinMarketCap data.
   citedrekt.news/ankr-helio-rektbeincrypto.com/bnb-based-hay-destablecoi…eg-ankr-exploit/
8. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Cascading Impact: Helio Protocol and HAY Stablecoin Depeg

   “Total losses across the Ankr primary exploit and Helio secondary exploit were approximately $24 million.”

   reviewerTotal losses across the Ankr primary exploit and Helio secondary exploit were approximately $24 million.Internally consistent with the summary and with rekt.news's reported figures.
   citedrekt.news/ankr-helio-rekt
9. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Insider Threat Attribution

   “Ankr alerted law enforcement and stated it was 'in the process of working with law enforcement to prosecute the former team member and bring them to justice.' As of available reporting through 2023, no public confirmation of an arrest, indictment, or successful prosecution of the identified former employee has been reported.”

   reviewerAnkr publicly attributed the attack to a former team member and stated it was working with law enforcement; no public confirmation of arrest, indictment or prosecution has been reported through 2025.No subsequent reporting of an arrest or prosecution was found through the current date (Oct 2026), consistent with the page's hedged claim.
   citedwww.ankr.com/blog/after-action-report-ou…c-token-exploit/www.coindesk.com/business/2022/12/21/def…aused-5m-exploit
10. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Compensation Disputes and User Reimbursement

    “Ankr claimed it compensated affected users across staking solutions and protocols an aggregate amount of approximately $30 million.”

    reviewerAnkr claimed it compensated affected users across staking solutions and protocols an aggregate amount of approximately $30 million.Confirmed by an independent report of Ankr's own statement.
    citedwww.ankr.com/blog/the-details-of-ankrs-b…on-compensation/
11. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Compensation Disputes and User Reimbursement

    “The group alleged that Ankr only reimbursed them 50% of BNB lost, specifically noting that users holding tokens through two affected protocols — Stader and pStake — received relief for only 50% of their value lost rather than 100%.”

    reviewerA victims group alleged Ankr only reimbursed 50% of losses for users affected through Stader and pStake.Well supported by the cited article, which also captures the dispute over whether Stader agreed to the 50% plan.
    citedcointelegraph.com/news/ankr-exploit-vict…imbursed-them-50
12. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Post-Exploit Security Measures

    “In 2024, Ankr's enterprise services arm Asphere achieved SOC 2 Type 1 compliance, followed by SOC 2 Type 2 compliance in 2025.”

    reviewerIn 2024, Ankr's Asphere achieved SOC 2 Type 1 compliance, followed by SOC 2 Type 2 compliance in 2025.Both milestones are directly confirmed by Ankr's own cited blog posts.
    citedwww.ankr.com/blog/ankr-2025-wrap-up/