← Zoth ZeUSDreviewed 2026-11-02 · 11 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Zoth ZeUSD against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
stale
1 claimThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #6[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
“The protocol's current TVL on DeFiLlama stands at approximately $2.2 million as of mid-2025”
reviewerCurrent TVL is about $2.2M as of mid-2025Describing a mid-2025 figure as current is superseded. The correction relies on a search-snippet reading of DeFiLlama and is not confirmed by a direct fetch.Proposed correction (not yet applied)DeFiLlama showed TVL of approximately $2.2 million in mid-2025, but by October 2026 it listed Zoth ZeUSD TVL at effectively zero (daily TVL recorded as $0 from 21 September 2026).
partially supported
4 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Second Exploit — March 21, 2025 ($8.4M–$8.85M Admin Key Compromise)
“a design flaw identified by both Halborn and Blockscope as the root cause”
reviewerHalborn identified the single-EOA design as the root causeHalborn supports the single-key lesson; Blockscope's attribution of root cause to the design is weaker than stated. - #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“Zoth is a Dubai-based real-world asset (RWA) restaking protocol and the issuer of ZeUSD”
reviewerPresent-tense description of Zoth as an operating issuerThe description is accurate as background, but present tense implies an active protocol while later data suggests it is dormant. See omission_findings. - #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Zoth secures $15M strategic token commitment from Bolts Capital to fund protocol recovery and ZeUSD relaunch”
reviewerBolts Capital $15M commitment announced in August 2025The commitment is real, but sources disagree on timing (May vs August 2025). I did not read the Medium announcement (403), so I propose no correction. - #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
“User retention was reported internally at above 80% during the recovery period.”
reviewerRetention above 80% reported internallyClaim comes from Zoth's own press release, not an independent source. It also sits uneasily beside a TVL fall from $27M to $2.2M.
confirmed
6 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Second Exploit — March 21, 2025 ($8.4M–$8.85M Admin Key Compromise)
“At 8:46 UTC, the attacker executed the upgradeToAndCall function on the USD0PPSubVaultUpgradeable proxy contract”
reviewerOn-chain details of the March 21 exploit (upgrade tx, drain tx, times, implementation contract, deployer wallet, 8,851,750.3737 USD0++) are accurateHashes, addresses and times match Blockscope exactly. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: First Exploit — March 1, 2025 ($285,000 LTV Logic Flaw)
“The exploit transaction was recorded on-chain at hash 0xc3f70057e261af554c6acf6a372389899f0c2d7d1ebd27311e39525dee88fb39.”
reviewerMarch 1 exploit: $285,000 loss via LTV logic flaw; tx hashCore facts confirmed; Verichains-specific token counts not independently checked. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Smart Contract and Operational Security Assessment
“(holding approximately 3,233 ETH post-attack)”
reviewerAttacker wallet balances and total ETHMatches source; the figures are a March 25 snapshot, not current. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Response and Recovery Efforts
“Zoth froze approximately 73% of its total value locked to limit further damage.”
reviewerZoth froze about 73% of TVL and offered a $500,000 bountyThe PR Newswire release does not mention the 73% freeze, but lazarus.day does. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Whitestream threat intelligence report tags the March 21 exploit with a Lazarus Group attribution indicator (via lazarus.day)”
reviewerWhitestream/lazarus.day Lazarus tag dated 2025-04-13Page appropriately labels this a single-source tag. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Background and Team
“Halborn noted that many failed access attempts went undetected prior to the successful exploit”
reviewerHalborn noted many failed attempts went undetectedMatches the source.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.