← Zilliqareviewed 2026-10-16 · 21 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Zilliqa against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
1 claimThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #6[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“a separate, distinct incident from March 2025 involving similar circumstances also generated speculation linking South Korean exchange Bithumb, which suspended ZIL activity around the same period, but neither Zilliqa nor Bithumb has confirmed Bithumb as the affected partner in either case”
reviewerA separate, distinct incident from March 2025 involving similar circumstances also generated speculation linking BithumbNone of the page's eight cited sources for this section mention a March 2025 incident. Independent searches found Bithumb's ZIL deposit/withdrawal suspensions and security-related warnings clustered in July 2026 (concurrent with the main incident, plus a related Ledger-wallet vulnerability disclosed days later), not in March 2025. The only hit for a 'March 2025' date is an uncited, low-credibility aggregator with an internally inconsistent timestamp, suggesting this clause is a fabricated or erroneously dated addition not supported by any source on the page.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Bithumb, a South Korean exchange, suspended ZIL deposits and withdrawals around the same period as this July 2026 incident (and again in July 2026 over a related Ledger wallet vulnerability), which generated speculation linking Bithumb to the theft, but neither Zilliqa nor Bithumb has confirmed Bithumb as the affected partner
unverifiable
2 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“No SEC, DOJ, or comparable regulatory enforcement action against Zilliqa as an entity was identified in available reporting as of this writing”
reviewerNo SEC, DOJ, or comparable regulatory enforcement action against Zilliqa as an entity was identified in available reportingThis is a negative claim (absence of enforcement action). No contrary evidence was found, which is consistent with the claim, but a definitive 'no enforcement action exists' cannot be proven by search alone; treated as unverifiable rather than confirmed per reviewer guidance, though no sources were cited on the page for this specific sentence. - #17[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“no credible scam allegations against the core project were found beyond general low-credibility forum speculation (e.g., a Bitcointalk thread titled 'Zilliqa = scam?') that does not constitute a substantiated claim”
reviewerNo credible scam allegations against the core project were found beyond low-credibility forum speculation, e.g. a Bitcointalk thread titled 'Zilliqa = scam?'Could not confirm the specific Bitcointalk thread title exists via the cited source; the broader point (no substantiated scam allegations found) is plausible but the specific illustrative example is unverified.
stale
5 claimsThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #1[stale][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“a claim that as of this writing is corroborated by only one secondary source and remains unconfirmed by Zilliqa's promised full post-mortem”
reviewerZilliqa's own preliminary post-July-2026-incident findings are corroborated by only one secondary source and remain unconfirmed by Zilliqa's promised full post-mortemAt the time the page's cited sources (July 20-21, 2026) were published, the attribution was indeed single-sourced and unconfirmed as the page says. But a post-mortem was published by Zilliqa in late August 2026 (per CryptoSlate and corroborating outlets), which is more recent than the page's claimed 'as of this writing' status and resolves the root-cause question the page leaves open.Proposed correction (not yet applied)a claim that was subsequently corroborated, in different specifics, by Zilliqa's post-mortem published in late August 2026, which attributed the theft to an entropy flaw in Zilliqa's own Ledger hardware-wallet signing application rather than to exchange custody practices - #2[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“As of this writing, Zilliqa has not disclosed the quantity of ZIL stolen, its dollar value, or the identity of the exchange.”
reviewerAs of this writing, Zilliqa has not disclosed the quantity of ZIL stolen, its dollar value, or the identity of the exchangeTrue as of July 20-21, 2026 (the page's cited sources), but superseded by Zilliqa's own post-mortem roughly a month later, which disclosed the stolen quantity. USD value still appears undisclosed per available reporting.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Zilliqa's post-mortem, published in late August 2026, subsequently disclosed a proven theft total of approximately 683.13 million ZIL across 66 transactions; a USD value for the theft and full confirmation of the affected exchange's identity have still not been disclosed. - #3[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“Neither Zilliqa nor any exchange has publicly named the affected platform”
reviewerNeither Zilliqa nor any exchange has publicly named the affected platformAccurate for the July 20-21, 2026 window the page cites, but later coverage of the August 2026 post-mortem names KuCoin in connection with the incident, so the blanket 'has not been named' framing is now stale.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Neither Zilliqa nor any exchange had, at the time of the initial July 20-21, 2026 reporting, publicly named the affected platform, though later reporting on Zilliqa's post-mortem identified KuCoin as involved in exposing and investigating the breach - #4[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Blame Attribution: Exchange Custody vs. Zilliqa Wallet Software — Disputed and Unresolved
“Given the single-source nature of the 'legacy ZIL1 wallet' attribution and the fact that Zilliqa's own promised full technical report had not been published as of this writing, this claim should be treated as unconfirmed and low-to-medium confidence.”
reviewerZilliqa's own promised full technical report had not been published as of this writingThis entire section is framed around an information gap (no post-mortem yet) that has since closed. The underlying judgment that responsibility sat with wallet software rather than exchange custody was directionally correct, though the specific mechanism (a Ledger app entropy bug) differs from the 'legacy ZIL1 wallet' phrasing attributed to CryptoTimes.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Zilliqa published its post-mortem in late August 2026, which confirmed the theft stemmed from an entropy flaw in the Ledger hardware-wallet signing implementation Zilliqa maintains — corroborating, with different specifics than the 'legacy ZIL1 wallet' framing, that the root cause sat with wallet software rather than exchange custody. - #5[stale][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“though this remains unconfirmed by a formal post-mortem and uncorroborated by other outlets”
reviewerAs of the July 21, 2026 update, the legacy-wallet root cause remains unconfirmed by a formal post-mortem and uncorroborated by other outletsAccurate as a snapshot of July 21, 2026 reporting, but a newer, more significant timeline event (the post-mortem's publication in late August 2026) is now missing from the page entirely; this entry's final clause is stale relative to current reporting.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Zilliqa's formal post-mortem, published in late August 2026, subsequently attributed the theft to an entropy flaw in its own Ledger hardware-wallet signing application, disclosing a total of approximately 683.13 million ZIL stolen across 66 transactions
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Blame Attribution: Exchange Custody vs. Zilliqa Wallet Software — Disputed and Unresolved
“Zilliqa allegedly stated it 'found no evidence that the incident was caused by the exchange's wallet management or operational processes' and that 'the root cause appears to be a technical issue affecting transaction signing in a specific set of legacy ZIL1 wallets'”
reviewerZilliqa 'allegedly stated' the two quoted phrases, both attributed in quotation marks as if verbatim Zilliqa statementsMinor sourcing imprecision: the page presents both phrases in quotation marks as if each is a direct Zilliqa statement, but only the first is confirmed verbatim; the second appears to be the journalist's characterization. The page's heavy surrounding hedging ('allegedly', 'if accurate', single-source caveat) substantially mitigates this, so it is not rated disputed, but the specific quotation-mark treatment of the second phrase overstates its sourcing. - #19[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“It was co-founded by Amrit Kumar, Yaoqi Jia, Xinshu Dong, and Max Kantelia, and in 2019 became one of the first public blockchains to launch with a sharded architecture in production.”
reviewerZilliqa was co-founded by Amrit Kumar, Yaoqi Jia, Xinshu Dong, and Max KanteliaThree of the four named co-founders are well-corroborated across sources. Max Kantelia's specific role is described inconsistently across secondary sources — co-founder of Anquan Capital (Zilliqa's backer) in some, co-founder of Zilliqa itself in others — so this one name should be treated as moderately, not fully, confirmed.
confirmed
11 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“On July 20, 2026, Zilliqa announced that ZIL tokens had been stolen from a cold wallet belonging to an unnamed exchange partner, and asked all exchanges to temporarily pause ZIL deposits and withdrawals network-wide to prevent the stolen funds from being moved or liquidated.”
reviewerOn July 20, 2026, Zilliqa announced ZIL tokens stolen from a cold wallet belonging to an unnamed exchange partner and asked exchanges to pause deposits/withdrawalsCorroborated by multiple independent outlets (Cointelegraph, Whale Alert, KuCoin news, BYDFi) beyond the page's own cited sources. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“Bitget confirmed it suspended ZIL deposits and withdrawals from July 20, describing the pause publicly as 'wallet maintenance' rather than confirming its own involvement.”
reviewerBitget confirmed it suspended ZIL deposits and withdrawals from July 20, describing the pause publicly as 'wallet maintenance' rather than confirming its own involvementDirectly confirmed by the cited HokaNews article and corroborated by crypto.news. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“ZIL's price fell in a range reported between roughly 9% and 15% in the hours following the announcement (accounts vary by outlet and snapshot time), with trading volume reported by one outlet as up nearly 500% to about $47.6 million, before partially recovering.”
reviewerZIL's price fell in a range reported between roughly 9% and 15% in the hours following the announcement; trading volume reported by one outlet as up nearly 500% to about $47.6 millionThe page's hedging ('accounts vary by outlet and snapshot time') is well-justified; estimates found ranged from about 7% to 15% across outlets, consistent with the page's range. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Blame Attribution: Exchange Custody vs. Zilliqa Wallet Software — Disputed and Unresolved
“This specific claim was not independently corroborated in the other outlets reviewed (crypto.news, Cryptonomist, HokaNews), which describe the root cause as still undetermined and pending a technical post-mortem Zilliqa has promised but not yet published.”
reviewerOne source (CryptoTimes) reports Zilliqa stated it 'found no evidence that the incident was caused by the exchange's wallet management or operational processes' and that 'the root cause appears to be a technical issue affecting transaction signing in a specific set of legacy ZIL1 wallets', uncorroborated by crypto.news, Cryptonomist, and HokaNewsVerified accurate as of the July 20-21, 2026 reporting window; note elsewhere in this review that the single-source attribution was later superseded by Zilliqa's own post-mortem (stale finding above). - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Exchange-Partner Cold Wallet Theft
“Zilliqa has stated the blockchain protocol itself was not compromised and that the incident is confined to a partner's custody infrastructure.”
reviewerZilliqa has stated the blockchain protocol itself was not compromised and the incident is confined to a partner's custody infrastructureSubstance confirmed; exact wording in the page is a paraphrase rather than a direct quote, but accurately represents the cited reporting. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: February 2025 X-Bridge Exploit — Protocol-Level Vulnerability
“The attacker minted approximately 531 zETH and 2.2133 zBNB; roughly 123.116 zETH and 2.2133 zBNB were bridged back to Ethereum and BSC respectively, and about 140.378 zETH was sold on ZilSwap for roughly $42,000 in USDT plus a small amount of zWBTC that was also bridged out and liquidated.”
reviewerOn February 6, 2025, Zilliqa identified an X-Bridge exploit; attacker minted ~531 zETH and 2.2133 zBNB; ~123.116 zETH and 2.2133 zBNB bridged back; ~140.378 zETH sold on ZilSwap for ~$42,000 USDT plus a small amount of zWBTC also bridged out and liquidatedExact figures confirmed against the official source. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: February 2025 X-Bridge Exploit — Protocol-Level Vulnerability
“Zilliqa's team paused the bridge relayer and affected token-manager contracts, deprecated the compromised zETH/zBNB tokens, and deployed replacement contracts that preserved legitimate balances as of specified block heights while excluding the attacker's illegitimately minted tokens.”
reviewerZilliqa's mitigation: paused the bridge relayer and affected token-manager contracts, deprecated compromised zETH/zBNB, deployed replacement contracts preserving legitimate balances as of specified block heightsConfirmed in detail against the official blog. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: February 2025 X-Bridge Exploit — Protocol-Level Vulnerability
“Zilliqa CEO Matt Dyer resigned on April 8, 2025, roughly two months after the exploit; the resignation announcement did not state a reason and Zilliqa's public messaging framed the intervening period around migration to 'Zilliqa 2.0' rather than the bridge incident, so a causal link between the exploit and the resignation has not been established in available reporting.”
reviewerZilliqa CEO Matt Dyer resigned on April 8, 2025, roughly two months after the exploit, with no stated reason; a causal link to the exploit has not been establishedConfirmed; the page's hedged, non-causal framing matches the underlying reporting precisely. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“Zilliqa is a layer-1 blockchain platform founded in Singapore in 2017, originating from blockchain-sharding research at the National University of Singapore.”
reviewerZilliqa founded in Singapore in 2017, originating from blockchain-sharding research at the National University of SingaporeConfirmed via independent sources beyond the cited one. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“in 2019 became one of the first public blockchains to launch with a sharded architecture in production”
reviewerIn 2019, Zilliqa became one of the first public blockchains to launch with a sharded architecture in productionConfirmed, though note the 'first' framing is the project's own characterization, appropriately hedged by the page as 'one of the first' rather than definitively 'the first'. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Project Background and Legitimacy Indicators
“Zilliqa's smart contracts have undergone independent third-party audits, including a ChainSecurity review dating to the project's 2017 token launch and subsequent audits by firms including Hacken.”
reviewerZilliqa's smart contracts underwent independent audits including a ChainSecurity review dating to the 2017 token launch and subsequent audits by firms including HackenConfirmed via ChainSecurity's own audit page; the Hacken page could not be directly fetched (403) but its existence and relevance were corroborated via search.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.