← Zabu Financereviewed 2026-10-16 · 16 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Zabu Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #8[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Price Collapse and Market Impact
“CoinTelegraph reported the token briefly recovered approximately 25% to trade around $0.00005, but the token never recovered to pre-hack levels.”
reviewerCointelegraph reported the ZABU token briefly recovered approximately 25% to trade around $0.00005.The 25%/$0.00005 figures are accurate, but they come from AMBCrypto — a source this section does cite — not from Cointelegraph, which is never cited anywhere on this page. This is a publisher misattribution, grouped with the adjacent 'flatlined' claim as the same underlying sourcing defect.Proposed correction (not yet applied)AMBCrypto reported the token briefly recovered approximately 25% to trade around $0.00005, but the token never recovered to pre-hack levels. - #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Flag
“ZachXBT, the pseudonymous on-chain investigator known for flagging fraudulent and high-risk crypto projects, has flagged Zabu Finance as a risky entity.”
reviewerZachXBT has flagged Zabu Finance as a risky entity.The section's own text admits 'the specific basis for ZachXBT's flag was not recoverable from publicly indexed posts,' yet still states as fact that ZachXBT 'has flagged Zabu Finance.' The single cited source (Wikipedia's ZachXBT article) does not mention Zabu Finance at all, and no independent search turned up any ZachXBT statement about this project. This section presents an unsupported claim as a sourced fact.Proposed correction (not yet applied)No public ZachXBT post or statement specifically naming Zabu Finance could be located in this review, and the Wikipedia article cited for this section does not mention Zabu Finance; this entry's description of a 'ZachXBT flag' could not be independently verified.
unverifiable
6 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Price Collapse and Market Impact
“Cointelegraph described the price as having 'flatlined.'”
reviewerCointelegraph described the ZABU price as having 'flatlined' after the hack.No Cointelegraph article about Zabu Finance could be located by search, and neither of this section's two cited sources contains the 'flatlined' quote or any reference to Cointelegraph. Cointelegraph is not listed anywhere in sources_used for this page. This looks like a fabricated attribution rather than a sourcing slip, but I could not positively disprove a Cointelegraph article exists, so I am not marking it disputed. - #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Protocol Status
“DefiLlama lists Zabu Finance with a total value locked of approximately $5,147 on Avalanche, indicating negligible active usage.”
reviewerDefiLlama lists Zabu Finance with a TVL of approximately $5,147 on Avalanche (as of 2026).Could not independently confirm the current $5,147 TVL figure. Separately, the page's own citation metadata shows the archived DefiLlama snapshot was captured 2025-09-06, about eight months before the 2026-05 data point the timeline attributes to it — the cited archive cannot itself be the source of a May 2026 reading. - #12[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“DefiLlama records Zabu Finance TVL at approximately $5,147. ZABU token is delisted from major exchanges. Protocol is effectively dormant.”
reviewerDefiLlama records Zabu Finance TVL at approximately $5,147 in May 2026; ZABU is delisted from major exchanges; protocol is effectively dormant.This timeline entry has no source attached (source: "") and restates the sections[4] TVL figure; see that finding for the archive-date mismatch. Could not independently confirm the current TVL or delisting status. - #13[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Protocol Status
“The protocol's website SSL certificate expired in August 2022 and was not renewed.”
reviewerThe protocol's website SSL certificate expired in August 2022 and was not renewed.No source is cited for this claim (the section's two sources are DefiLlama and Coinbase, neither of which would record SSL certificate history), and no certificate-transparency or archive tooling was available in this review to check it independently. Same unsupported fact also appears in the summary and in timeline[4]. - #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Protocol Status
“The protocol is not listed for trading on Coinbase or Binance.”
reviewerZabu Finance (ZABU) is not listed for trading on Coinbase or Binance.Could not independently verify current exchange listing status; Binance was not checked. Plausible given ZABU's near-zero market cap, but unconfirmed. - #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Known Vulnerability — Prior Warning Ignored
“No evidence of a pre-deployment security audit from an established firm has been identified in public records.”
reviewerNo evidence of a pre-deployment security audit from an established firm has been identified for Zabu Finance.A negative claim (absence of an audit) that is plausible — none of the postmortems reviewed mention an audit firm — but cannot be proven conclusively from available sources.
partially supported
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Known Vulnerability — Prior Warning Ignored
“Security firm PeckShield commented immediately after the hack that 'the same bug happened many times before,' highlighting that the deflationary-token accounting flaw was a publicly known vulnerability in the DeFi ecosystem.”
reviewerPeckShield stated after the hack that 'the same bug happened many times before,' referring to the deflationary-token accounting flaw.The quote itself checks out against third-party reporting, but none of the three sources cited in this section (Halborn, BeInCrypto, Quadriga Initiative) is the one that actually carries it — AMBCrypto does, and AMBCrypto is cited elsewhere on the page but not here. - #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Price Collapse and Market Impact
“Immediately following the exploit, the ZABU token price collapsed from approximately $0.004 to approximately $0.00002, a decline of roughly 99.5%.”
reviewerZABU price collapsed from approximately $0.004 to approximately $0.00002, a ~99.5% decline.The magnitude of the collapse is corroborated by a third-party source, but the specific $0.004 pre-hack price point could not be confirmed in the two sources the page actually cites for this section. - #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Team Response and V2 Recovery Attempt
“The team also burned approximately 93.12 million remaining ZABU tokens, then valued at approximately $360,000, as part of the recovery effort.”
reviewerThe team burned approximately 93.12 million remaining ZABU tokens, then valued at approximately $360,000, as part of the recovery effort.The 93.12 million figure is corroborated by a third-party report (ForkLog) not cited on this page, but none of the three sources actually cited for this section states either the 93.12M quantity or the ~$360,000 valuation — that valuation is also internally odd, since it only reconciles with the roughly $0.004 pre-hack price, not the near-zero post-hack price, and the page does not explain which price point it used.
confirmed
5 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Flash Loan Exploit — September 2021
“On September 12, 2021, Zabu Finance was exploited for approximately $3.2 million, in what security researchers described as the first significant DeFi hack on the Avalanche blockchain.”
reviewerZabu Finance was exploited on September 12, 2021 for approximately $3.2 million, described as the first significant DeFi hack on Avalanche.Both cited sources independently confirm date, amount and the 'first on Avalanche' characterization (with appropriate hedging, which the page preserves). - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Flash Loan Exploit — September 2021
“The ZABUFarm contract's critical flaw was that it recorded the pre-fee amount the user deposited rather than the actual post-fee amount received by the contract. By cycling through deposits and withdrawals, the attacker gradually drained the contract's SPORE balance to near-zero.”
reviewerThe ZABUFarm contract recorded the pre-fee deposited amount rather than the post-fee received amount of SPORE (a deflationary/fee-on-transfer token), enabling the attacker to drain the pool via repeated deposit/withdraw cycles and mint ~4.5 billion ZABU as rewards.Mechanism matches Halborn's technical writeup closely. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Flash Loan Exploit — September 2021
“Attack contract 1 address: 0x0e65Fb2c02C72E9a2e32Cc42837df7E46219F400. Attack contract 2 address: 0x5c9AD7b877F06e751Ee006A3F27546757BBE53Dd. Attacker address: 0x9ed2D048e90CfFa5e4A778678CBc3acb8A3Abf86.”
reviewerAttack contract 1: 0x0e65Fb2c02C72E9a2e32Cc42837df7E46219F400; Attack contract 2: 0x5c9AD7b877F06e751Ee006A3F27546757BBE53Dd; Attacker address: 0x9ed2D048e90CfFa5e4A778678CBc3acb8A3Abf86.Could not directly read the cited SlowMist postmortem (blocked), but an independent third-party source gives the same attacker address, which corroborates the page's figures. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Known Vulnerability — Prior Warning Ignored
“The identical attack vector had been used to exploit PolyYeld Finance on Polygon in July 2021 — two months before Zabu's deployment — where a deflationary xYELD token was used to drain a MasterChef pool, causing the YELD token price to crash to zero and resulting in an estimated $250,000 loss.”
reviewerPolyYeld Finance on Polygon was exploited in July 2021 using an identical deflationary xYELD token / MasterChef accounting flaw, crashing YELD to zero and causing an estimated $250,000 loss.Matches cited source closely. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team Response and V2 Recovery Attempt
“Following the exploit, the Zabu Finance team set all farm rewards to zero to allow users to withdraw remaining funds without further losses. The team announced a recovery plan: a pre-hack snapshot would be taken, and ZABU v2 tokens would be distributed to users who held positions before the exploit. Users who purchased ZABU after the exploit would be allowed to participate in Farm V2 via a Zabu v1 Staking Pool.”
reviewerFollowing the exploit, the team set all farm rewards to zero and announced a snapshot-based ZABU v2 recovery plan, with post-hack buyers routed through a v1 staking pool into Farm V2.Matches both cited sources.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.