Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · SwissBorg
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 68 → 68 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457823520
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T23:38:57.837Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T23:39:18.648Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Fm1jcS3xDtB4LGSGrZvWc1yPx3N25JyFGdrwBm1iVwVz
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1787 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"d0db62a57509c72ecf0db0e4581efdb8","decided_at":"2026-10-16T23:38:57.227Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.32,"findings_hash":"GcwE5UFhjamLyKBCz6uh6Wc6vhU2hgQopM8gjFMcqjmy","investigation_id":"524894ae-ff61-4c27-9e9e-0f8c8069ce3e","mode":"findings_only","new_score":68,"page_content_hash":"a2d9de18bf96fa8f7dbcdf4f1ed4bb97bfa53a60bb99c920eac71afff9bdb352","page_slug":"swissborg","prev_score":68,"reason":"The page's core narrative — SwissBorg's legitimate regulatory standing and the September 2025 Kiln supply-chain hack — is well supported by primary and credible secondary sources, and the technical attack mechanics (GitHub token theft, CI/CD branch abuse, cloud credential harvesting, Kubernetes pod injection, withdrawal-authority reassignment) match Kiln's own post-mortem closely. However, the page attributes a direct quote to Kiln's post-mortem ('failed to decode the transaction before signing') that does not appear there — Kiln's actual language is general best-practice advice, not an explicit attribution of blame to SwissBorg — and this mischaracterization is used twice to support the page's harsher framing of SwissBorg's custody failures. The page also misquotes CEO Fazel's reimbursement pledge in one place, overstates the AMF MiCA authorization date by about a week against the official register, and names two incident responders (SEAL, Fireblocks) whose involvement could not be corroborated anywhere, including in the page's own cited sources. None of these defects change the substance of the central story, but they represent real sourcing errors that should be corrected.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}