Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 38 → 38 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443526120
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T13:12:03.168Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7gJsiQCXipfw3WWbe32Gvhz25MZiJAZGLUoE9zpCsekQ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1250 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T13:12:03.038Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"f187a829-54e4-4673-b2b7-6c4dea8103c9","new_score":38,"page_slug":"zcash-orchard-counterfeit-vulnerability","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page's core technical narrative -- the halo2_gadgets soundness bug, Hornby's AI-assisted discovery, the two-stage emergency patch, and the correct, carefully-hedged framing of exploitation as unresolvable rather than ruled out -- is well supported by primary sources including Shielded Labs' own disclosure and the Zcash community forum. The most consequential defects are a one-day discrepancy between the page's June 5 disclosure date and the primary source's June 4 date (repeated in the summary, a section, and the timeline), a misattribution of the actual vulnerability fix to zcashd v6.12.5 rather than v6.20.0, three first-of-month placeholder dates in the timeline that do not match documented events, and a stale characterization of the Ironwood upgrade as still-proposed when it in fact launched on July 28, 2026 and has been live for a month as of this review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}