Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Summer.fi Lazy Summer Exploit (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 20 → 12 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443522992
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T03:07:01.364Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- M1jDgJue3ntQs5voZoE2APhHtVURCGNShREzu83SL6H
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1909 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:07:01.160Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6e55f8b2-3144-47ec-94b4-ab11d0f072c2","new_score":12,"page_slug":"summer-fi-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":20,"reason":"The incident narrative itself holds up well: 26 of 33 checked claims are confirmed and the core facts -- amounts, timing, attack mechanics, on-chain addresses, and root cause -- are corroborated by the official post-mortem and independent security analysis, with claim_findings[26] noting the page's root-cause framing matches rather than overstates the post-mortem. Only one claim is genuinely disputed: claim_findings[7], a background-section date for a 2023 Series A round that independent records place roughly 16 months earlier, which is a corporate-history detail rather than an error in the incident itself. However, the Remediation section (claim_findings[27], tied to a high-priority coverage gap) tells readers the protocol is pausing vaults while patches are developed, but omits that the operating company, Summer.fi Labs, announced a full wind-down nine days after the exploit -- a materially different and more severe outcome than what the section conveys. That omission changes the meaning of the page's ending for a reader deciding how much ongoing risk the entity still poses, so it is treated as more than an 'expand later' gap and pushes the verdict to revise despite the low disputed_pct. Two link_rot findings (claim_findings[31], [32]) further show sourcing-hygiene lapses -- one archive snapshot points to an unrelated article and one repeatedly-cited source is dead with no backup -- but since the underlying facts they support remain independently verifiable, these are treated as minor, not core-narrative, defects.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}