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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · CrossCurve
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#5
Score
67 → 67 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464267311
Off-chain at
2026-11-01T22:54:05.303Z
Anchored at
2026-11-01T22:54:23.000Z
Block time
2026-11-01T22:54:23.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
C44QCYziSeL8g5UkFnBW2V3ab466WYUgwuNLuqnia3mN
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1730 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"59875ea48ab91b727e0afcd7635cdb0e","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.067Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"c18c86d7-2fb4-4de4-9c16-385555f1a0cb","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":67,"page_slug":"crosscurve","prev_score":67,"reason":"Of 8 checked claims, 2 (25%) were disputed or unverifiable: the QuillAudits post-mortem is dated 3 February 2026 rather than March (claim_findings[0]), and the long list of affected chains could not be confirmed beyond Ethereum and Arbitrum (claim_findings[3]). The only source for the Hashlock audit claims now returns HTTP 410 (claim_findings[5] and [6]), which leaves those audit details without a live citation. The page also omits that CrossCurve later reactivated services and opened a withdrawal mode for the old bridge. The core account of the February 2026 exploit is supported by Halborn, QuillAudits and press coverage.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports one material omission (later service restoration and old-bridge withdrawal mode), but its only source is a low-tier aggregator feed with relative dates, and subject_status.contradicts_page is false because the page already says operations were suspended. The omission is handled as a requested text addition within the minor band rather than a harsher band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}