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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443518686
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T23:08:42.071Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DWSosSzNwDyQ7hanzT98qjFTSELqqHioQ81Nqgy12Wgw
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2277 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T23:08:41.930Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"1432a256-9098-4bcb-8698-a7e4ea73c243","new_score":0,"page_slug":"coldcard-coinkite-august-2026-multi-actor-attacker-cluster","prev_score":0,"reason":"Independently re-tallying the reviewer's 38 claim findings confirms 25 confirmed, 6 partially supported, 2 disputed, and 5 unverifiable, giving a disputed_pct of 7/38 (~18.4%) under the disputed-plus-unverifiable formula, which places this page in the minor-issues revision band rather than approval or denial. The page's core narrative -- attacker count, stolen-fund totals, wave breakdown, the RNG/firmware root cause, and law-enforcement cooperation -- holds up well against independent sources, and the review found no cross-contamination with the unrelated Blockstream Jade page and confirmed the page correctly frames this as a product defect rather than alleging fraud or malice by Coinkite (claim_findings[37], coverage_gaps[3]). Set against that, the review found a real and repeated dating error: the page places the first attack wave on July 31, 2026, but Galaxy Research's own primary data and other outlets place it on July 30 (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[10]) -- the underlying BTC amounts and duration are accurate, only the calendar date is off, appearing consistently in the summary, a section, and the timeline. The review also could not verify the claim that Galaxy shared attacker addresses with the Security Alliance (SEAL) in any source, including the one cited for it (claim_findings[33]), and found that the AI-rediscovery/Tokenomist dispute claim, while factually accurate, is not supported by any of the five sources cited for that section (claim_findings[27]) -- a sourcing mismatch rather than a factual error. Finally, the review flagged a high-priority gap: the page omits Coinkite's reported class-action exposure and disputed legal liability, which matters for readers assessing corporate accountability (coverage_gaps[0]). These issues justify a mid-band penalty and a revision request, without triggering investigation status or delisting.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}