Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · AscendEX (BitMax)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515302
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T14:25:29.958Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5aqQ66vSdgCVR8ySxZ7AkY8ZABFAaAmTKaazWmnn9x3h
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2282 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T14:25:29.078Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a2376978-bfce-4a51-9673-406ac00d7f5d","new_score":0,"page_slug":"ascendex-bitmax","prev_score":12,"reason":"The reviewer verified 33 claims and found a disputed_pct of about 15% (3 disputed + 2 unverifiable of 33), which falls in the minor-issues band, but the composition of the disputed items pulls the penalty toward the upper end of that band. Two of the three disputed findings (claim_findings[21] and [29]) are the same defect appearing twice on this page: the page states as established fact that 'multiple on-chain security agencies' attributed the December 2021 hack to North Korea's Lazarus Group, but none of the four sources the page cites for that claim make the attribution, and a dedicated incident tracker (rekt.news) records the attacker as unidentified. Naming a specific state-linked actor without support is a meaningful accuracy problem in a section heading and body text, not a minor detail. The third disputed item, claim_findings[11], is lower severity: the RootData '46% C-level transparency' figure is real and appears in a source cited elsewhere on the page (ChainCatcher), it is simply misattributed to three sources that do not contain it -- a provenance error, not a false fact. Separately, claim_findings[20] shows the page records AscendEX's 2021 reimbursement pledge without noting independent reporting indicates it was fulfilled, which leaves an unfairly unresolved impression on a fact favorable to the company. The two unverifiable findings (claim_findings[12], [16]) trace to ascendex.com returning HTTP 403 to the reviewer, a source-access limitation rather than a page defect, and the two stale findings (claim_findings[3], [13]) reflect that the page's 'no public statement' framing was accurate on June 26, 2026 but was overtaken days later by AscendEX's operational shutdown -- also not a defect at time of writing. Reviewer confidence of 0.72 and the mixed severity of the disputed items support a mid-range penalty within the minor-issues band rather than escalation to significant-issues.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}