Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443523359
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T03:46:57.801Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 94tQFzMLXjwD3aVNN5euMmpHXABQtkSyFVCoRWHjvTU3
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1585 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:46:57.657Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"c3596645-7c79-4441-af5c-31779a8dc309","new_score":18,"page_slug":"coldcard-coinkite-firmware-seed-generation-exploit-july-august-2026","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's technical account of the vulnerability (root cause, entropy reduction, affected firmware versions) is well-sourced and accurately reflects both Coinkite's own advisory and Block Engineering's independent technical analysis, correctly distinguishing near-full determinism (Mk2/Mk3) from bounded entropy reduction (Mk4/Q/Mk5) rather than conflating them. The page's central weakness is its loss-total figure: the 1,367 BTC/$88.6M/4,585-address tally is accurately attributed to Galaxy Research's August 2, 2026 update but has been superseded by well-corroborated later reporting showing a fourth attack wave and a final documented total of roughly $116-130M+ across 5,200-7,300+ addresses through at least August 10-19, 2026, which the page does not reflect. A secondary issue is an overstated claim that Wave 1 and Wave 2 shared an identical transaction fee fingerprint, which contradicts Galaxy Research's own published caveat that the fee constant differed between the waves. Real theft (not merely theoretical exposure) is well-documented and correctly framed as such, and the page omits Coinkite's shipment halt and inventory destruction, a notable remediation action.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}