Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443516073
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T18:58:46.790Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EF1JA38RiHQobeUtaWpxDiVrTum8VSv1V6Es1NhyzLpD
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1102 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:58:46.630Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"6b5ba28c-6fa5-43c6-aa57-c6b43966b0ed","new_score":0,"page_slug":"eu-mica-post-deadline-regulator-impersonation-scam-cluster","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a post-MiCA-deadline scam wave impersonating ESMA, the AMF, and other regulators, sourced substantially to a single Financial Times report repeated across the crypto press — is well corroborated, including against ESMA's and the AMF's own primary statements, and the page correctly identifies Coinbase, Kraken, and OKX as MiCA-authorized rather than mislabeling an authorized exchange as non-compliant. However, the page names Belgium's FSMA and the National Bank of Hungary as impersonation targets without any locatable supporting source, and contains an internally inconsistent CASP-registry statistic (323 firms paired with a 74% growth figure that mathematically requires 338).","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}