Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Dexodus Finance
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 48 → 48 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457766710
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T20:14:08.698Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T20:14:31.868Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BmZoMAp8eHKPACxfUj6sFXnvViFBMCEq8TAwENvv9Xsf
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1757 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"77a803cb891ac152b4dbfb3679d510d6","decided_at":"2026-10-16T20:14:08.306Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4348,"findings_hash":"3wrTS3d7jVGn76qQ9DGyVcFqAvWKFFzKAXHevK8phVNM","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","mode":"findings_only","new_score":48,"page_content_hash":"f8d331d375e73568c3bf20f37bd0c5dd5d29fd5e333b2361268b545985303b85","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (May 26, 2025, $291K-$300K loss, stale Chainlink oracle signature replay via performUpkeep(), the specific attack methodology, OWASP classification, and transaction hash) is well-supported by two independent technical post-mortems (QuillAudits, SolidityScan) and is the strongest part of the page. The most significant defect is a factual date inversion repeated in four places (summary, two sections, and a timeline entry): the page frames Halborn's DexodusV2 audit as a post-exploit remediation step dated August 1, 2025, but Halborn's own report shows the engagement ran December 17, 2024 - January 7, 2025, months before the exploit. The page also contains an internal inconsistency about fund recovery: it hedges that no Tier 1/2 source confirms the team's 'full recovery within 24 hours' claim, yet DeFiLlama -- a source the page itself cites elsewhere -- records the incident as fully returned funds. Founder identities, incorporation details, and TVL figures rest on sources (Tracxn, RocketReach) that returned 403s and could not be independently checked. No regulatory record was found, consistent with the page's claim.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}