Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 22 → 22 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521048
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T12:10:48.418Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3ECTgBEa9TYAxEChSeo8XVogxaGkcxeuAjZNozNPM1KG
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1332 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:10:48.309Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"98749b11-466d-49ba-967e-094583968ae7","new_score":22,"page_slug":"zilliqa-exchange-partner-cold-wallet-hack-july-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The page's claims are well-supported by its cited sources on essentially every checkable point, including precise technical and financial figures that were independently verified almost verbatim against Zilliqa's official status page. However, five claims that the page frames as open or unresolved (the exchange partner's identity, the fund-tracing/whereabouts, and the general recovery-effort framing) are superseded by Zilliqa's official post-mortem published 2026-08-20, six days before this review, which the page's 17-source list does not include; the post-mortem names KuCoin, discloses a March-to-July 2026 theft window rather than a single July event, refines the signature threshold from five to four, and states recovery is now deemed unlikely. No phantom 'second incident' or Bithumb/March-2025 error was found on this page. The page appears to substantially duplicate a separate 'zilliqa' investigation without cross-referencing it.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}