Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Rhea Finance Exploit (April 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 9 (-3)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425403836
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:52:25.595Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6kS1vMc5Yt9ZnuZbGGwfLipix7Rd2hWHdB74BLhBpQXb
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1571 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:52:25.392Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"4a96af88-86dd-43ea-aa9a-acfba1b7ebc3","new_score":9,"page_slug":"rhea-finance-exploit-april-2026","prev_score":12,"reason":"The review confirmed 18 of 25 claims outright and found no actively disputed claims, placing the disputed rate at 4% — well within the approve threshold. All core factual claims about the exploit itself (loss amounts, attack mechanism, attacker wallet prefix, Tether freeze, and recovery figures) are confirmed by multiple independent sources including Tier-1 outlets. The five partially supported claims are confined to peripheral comparisons and background context: claim_findings[13] overstates the KyberSwap 2023 loss figure ($54.7M stated vs approximately $47–49M per Hacken and KyberSwap's own post-mortem) and imprecisely characterizes the vulnerability similarity; claim_findings[14] understates the Mango Markets loss by $2M ($114M stated vs $116M widely reported); claim_findings[3] cites an unverifiable 95% TVL share figure with no Tier-1 source. These are errors in contextual comparisons, not in the primary event reporting. A minor score adjustment is applied to flag the KyberSwap figure as a correctable inaccuracy. Two high-priority coverage gaps (on-chain primary verification, official post-mortem direct link) should be addressed in a future revision but do not affect approval.","score_delta":-3,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}