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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
8 → 0 (-22)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443515568
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T17:24:23.647Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
6keqNHWPnV6doF46gPestBMc3LquZaAuPuegR4hV8Qk4
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2301 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T17:24:22.966Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6269bb42-c37e-4361-a723-04ab3cc5f416","new_score":0,"page_slug":"harmony-protocol-one-token-unauthorized-mint-exploit-august-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"The review confirms this page's technical reporting is solid: the cross-shard receipt vulnerability, the emergency patch, and the GitHub PR/commit hash all match primary sources exactly (claim_findings[6], claim_findings[7]), and the page correctly avoids attributing the 2026 exploit to the Lazarus Group despite that attribution belonging only to a separate 2022 incident (claim_findings[20]) - a distinction two comparable pages in this batch got wrong. However, the page's central numbers are now materially misleading to a current reader. It reports approximately 4 billion ONE minted (about 26% of supply, claim_findings[1]), while later reconstruction found the true forged total was 2.385 to 3.01 trillion ONE - roughly 600 to 750 times larger - which also undercuts the derived exchange-inflow and dollar-value figures (claim_findings[2], claim_findings[9]). The page still describes a blockchain rollback as merely 'pending' (claim_findings[13]); Harmony has since actually executed a rollback of two shards, discarding over 109,000 transactions. These numbers were accurate as of the sources the page drew on (Aug 12-13) and are correctly labeled by the reviewer as superseded rather than factually disputed, but because they sit at the core of the page's story and are still presented as the current picture, the page substantially understates the scale and status of the incident today. A separate citation for a December 2023 staking bug points to an article that never mentions that event at all (claim_findings[19]), a distinct sourcing error. The mechanical disputed-claim rate (about 9%) does not capture this because these are 'stale' rather than 'disputed' findings, but the review's own high-priority coverage gap on this exact point, combined with how central and how large the gap is, means the page needs a mandatory update and closer monitoring rather than a routine pass.","score_delta":-22,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}