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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
80 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443511816
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T04:06:11.305Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
7YSaWYu8nYU2y5NtejfovW1cyJzKeQZQh42M8QUMzuqW
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2576 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T04:06:11.043Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"19358cad-4557-4394-a860-f6a360b42cc6","new_score":0,"page_slug":"drift-protocol-dprk-exploit-april-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"The reviewer checked 44 discrete claims on this page and found 29 confirmed, 6 partially supported, 2 disputed, 6 unverifiable, and 1 stale, putting the disputed share at roughly 18% -- within the minor-issues range. The most serious problem is a tenfold dollar-value error: the page says the roughly 130,259 ETH still held by the attackers was worth 'roughly $31 million,' but the page's own cited source (The Defiant) and other independent reporting value that same holding at approximately $293 million (claim_findings[27]). A second disputed item is an internal date error: a timeline entry is dated January 2025 even though its own text and cited source describe the event as happening in 'fall 2025' (claim_findings[43]). Several partially-supported findings also show the page describing the Security Council's 2-of-5 multisig threshold as though it were a longstanding weakness, when independent reporting indicates that threshold was itself created days before the attack by a governance migration that also replaced most signers -- meaning the page, if anything, understates rather than overstates the severity of Drift's own governance failure (claim_findings[24], claim_findings[35]). Weighed against this, the reviewer credits the page for correctly separating Drift's own 'medium-high confidence' DPRK attribution from the more hedged language used by Elliptic and TRM Labs, which avoids overstating a serious accusation against a foreign state actor (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[11]). A high-priority coverage gap also flags that the recovery-plan timeline and 'largest hack of 2026' framing have gone stale relative to events after the page's sources were archived (a Q3 relaunch/rebrand and a competing exploit). None of the disputed or partially-supported items touch the page's central claims -- the $295.7 million confirmed loss and the DPRK/UNC4736 attribution both remain well supported by multiple independent sources -- so correction rather than removal is warranted, and because the errors found either concern a secondary figure or make the page too lenient rather than too harsh toward its subject, the penalty is set toward the lower end of the minor-issues range.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}