Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Drift Protocol DPRK Exploit (April 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 8 → 0 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443511816
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T04:06:11.305Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7YSaWYu8nYU2y5NtejfovW1cyJzKeQZQh42M8QUMzuqW
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2576 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T04:06:11.043Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"19358cad-4557-4394-a860-f6a360b42cc6","new_score":0,"page_slug":"drift-protocol-dprk-exploit-april-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"The reviewer checked 44 discrete claims on this page and found 29 confirmed, 6 partially supported, 2 disputed, 6 unverifiable, and 1 stale, putting the disputed share at roughly 18% -- within the minor-issues range. The most serious problem is a tenfold dollar-value error: the page says the roughly 130,259 ETH still held by the attackers was worth 'roughly $31 million,' but the page's own cited source (The Defiant) and other independent reporting value that same holding at approximately $293 million (claim_findings[27]). A second disputed item is an internal date error: a timeline entry is dated January 2025 even though its own text and cited source describe the event as happening in 'fall 2025' (claim_findings[43]). Several partially-supported findings also show the page describing the Security Council's 2-of-5 multisig threshold as though it were a longstanding weakness, when independent reporting indicates that threshold was itself created days before the attack by a governance migration that also replaced most signers -- meaning the page, if anything, understates rather than overstates the severity of Drift's own governance failure (claim_findings[24], claim_findings[35]). Weighed against this, the reviewer credits the page for correctly separating Drift's own 'medium-high confidence' DPRK attribution from the more hedged language used by Elliptic and TRM Labs, which avoids overstating a serious accusation against a foreign state actor (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[11]). A high-priority coverage gap also flags that the recovery-plan timeline and 'largest hack of 2026' framing have gone stale relative to events after the page's sources were archived (a Q3 relaunch/rebrand and a competing exploit). None of the disputed or partially-supported items touch the page's central claims -- the $295.7 million confirmed loss and the DPRK/UNC4736 attribution both remain well supported by multiple independent sources -- so correction rather than removal is warranted, and because the errors found either concern a secondary figure or make the page too lenient rather than too harsh toward its subject, the penalty is set toward the lower end of the minor-issues range.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}