Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · MEV Bot Scam — YouTube AI Trading Bot Campaign (2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 2 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443514733
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T13:44:18.234Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Cui2m4TxLUw8JyYJraFXVW6xLHwxhi6J6zkLhdNQZS83
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1760 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T13:44:17.758Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"7b08e7ad-67e1-442e-b82a-62c08f9922d7","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mev-bot-scam-youtube-ai-trading-bot-campaign-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"By raw count this page checks out well: 28 of 34 claims are confirmed and only 1 is disputed (2.9%), and the technical detail — wallet addresses, contract hashes, obfuscation code, and short-link URLs (claim_findings[9], [10], [11]) — matches the primary SentinelOne report exactly. The page also correctly declined to adopt an unsupported claim that the scam targets Solana and correctly kept a separate JFrog-documented campaign distinct from this one (claim_findings[24], [25]), which are signs of careful editing. But the one disputed item is not a minor slip: a timeline entry attributes a '$2 million, ~1,000 victims' Q1 2024 figure to 'Nefture Security' via a cited URL that contains no such claim, no mention of that firm, and no matching figures at all (claim_findings[28]) — this looks like an invented source attribution rather than a wrong date or number. Separately, the page states in three places that SentinelLABS itself put total losses at 'exceeding $1 million,' when SentinelOne's own report says 'more than $900k' and the $1M figure traces only to a news outlet's rounded headline (claim_findings[3], [18], [32]) — a repeated misattribution of a number to the wrong source. Neither problem touches the page's core, well-supported allegations, but together they are enough unresolved sourcing integrity issues to warrant correction before full approval.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}