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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
50 → 50 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
465091568
Off-chain at
2026-11-03T23:57:03.884Z
Anchored at
2026-11-03T23:57:17.000Z
Block time
2026-11-03T23:57:17.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BSdSvpnX1v4PdRWYgt3GKGdywRREBEe1hMgvamYj4uCw
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1362 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"cb3c38d41b6582b4d4167198da30e53e","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-11-03T23:57:03.823Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"6YJGkAG7ua9hpJaL55YG5THaHavC1s49nWLEM13WTGZV","investigation_id":"5f3633bd-c615-44e1-a887-a95b3cbdcfea","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":50,"page_content_hash":"12d58f21e94f3cc5ff93ebe84c6cae6541952ecfcb8058807f827ec1e75e47b5","page_slug":"atlantis-loans","prev_score":50,"reason":"The core narrative is supported by Rekt, Web3IsGoingGreat and Halborn: abandonment in April 2023, a governance attack in June 2023, $1.1M initially, and $2.5M later. Rekt and Halborn do not support some granular details such as the timelock, the ATL burn and the exact execution date, and the Medium sources were not checked. The timeline date for the $2.5M figure (June 12) is probably too early, since Rekt says it came about a week after the exploit. The 'rug pull' wording and the TVL figure were not verified.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":4,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"shut_down","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}