Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 38 → 38 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443526327
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T16:07:11.730Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- SccwNk27WindJu1MmM7KL76SjUKrcp8XRDgjsMnw5T6
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1193 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T16:07:11.466Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"906525a5-b86d-4d1f-bfd6-a3c27a894f5d","new_score":38,"page_slug":"taiko-bridge-sgx-key-exploit-june-2026","prev_score":38,"reason":"This page's core claims — the SGX key exposure mechanism, the ~$1.7M amount and its per-asset breakdown, the on-chain attack sequence (wallets, transaction hashes, contract addresses), and the disclosure/recovery chronology (pause, four-stage recovery, July 2 reopening, full user restitution) — were independently reproduced with high fidelity against a primary technical source (DARKNAVY) and multiple independent secondary outlets. The one notable issue is a contextual PeckShield bridge-exploit tally ($340.7M/14 exploits) that is accurately quoted but is a pre-Taiko snapshot not including the Taiko incident itself, which could mislead on how current/inclusive that figure is. One cited source (MEXC News) has gone link-rotten on the live web since archival, though its content remains independently corroborated.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}