Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Polymarket — June 2026 Supply Chain Attack
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 23 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464351960
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T03:56:28.433Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T03:56:37.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T03:56:37.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GDbWG9WmKMMnV9A9wtqgFJEytimVQuTVa6CQP7qYo2mD
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1992 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"9b56d3440735b34319ac5b0228516b3d","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T03:56:28.202Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2857,"investigation_id":"7a7d6f74-f219-4c4c-8b8c-4a9c8ef4fbe9","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":23,"page_slug":"polymarket-june-2026-supply-chain-attack","prev_score":38,"reason":"Of 7 claims checked, none were disputed and 2 could not be verified in the cited sources (claim_findings[2], the 70 percent marketing-video figure and June 20 WSJ date; claim_findings[3], the absence of a law enforcement referral), giving 28.6 percent, which falls in the minor band. The core incident facts (June 25 date, about $3.1M, at least 11 wallets, 1,893 ETH, refund pledge) were confirmed against Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. The page does not mention the October 29, 2026 repeat third-party breach (omission_findings[0], material) and the high-priority coverage gap asks for it to be added, so the penalty sits at the top of the minor range. The consolidation address rests on a single Tier 3 outlet (claim_findings[1]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-15,"score_limit":{"applied":-15,"limited":false,"proposed":-15,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-18},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a material omission (a second third-party provider breach disclosed on 2026-10-29, not mentioned on the page) and subject_status.contradicts_page is true, so the page is judged at the minor band at the harsh end instead of approved. The omission is a separate, later incident and the June facts are accurate, so it does not justify the significant band or an investigation status."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}