Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · CarbonVote Token
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457464938
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T02:07:35.949Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T02:08:03.456Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4whjU6iQ6m7ppMxXcJX4vAcznGK2FWpdRKWXkccCPXRW
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2586 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"46fda2f42f4060a23db3290e2ea62203","decided_at":"2026-10-16T02:07:35.771Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2917,"findings_hash":"3p8BhWRVAdk6cmBBw6jiJhCT3AUGmdqfLt2jrELR4akd","investigation_id":"cf85373b-cb36-442c-afb1-d11ef6759762","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"08254906f0d0368a4ff55f441742f0bbeaad75e14e2185f7c33381bd58dd2beb","page_slug":"carbonvote-token","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a fake Solana token (CVT) wash-traded to fabricate a price, whitelisted as collateral after a social-engineered multisig/durable-nonce takeover of Drift Protocol, draining roughly $285-295 million, attributed with medium confidence to the North Korean UNC4736/AppleJeus group — is well corroborated by the tier-1 and tier-2 sources cited (Chainalysis, TRM Labs, Elliptic, BlockSec, Hypernative, Nexus Mutual, Drift's own recovery update, CoinDesk, The Hacker News). Core figures (750M token supply, 80%/600M attacker-held, $500 Raydium seed, $285-295M loss range, Tether's $127.5M commitment, $295.4M/$295.7M loss figures) all check out against their cited sources. However, the review found a cluster of specific problems: (1) a 'across 26 asset types' figure attributed to Drift's official update that does not appear in that update, whose own table lists 19 assets; (2) a one-day date conflict between the page (March 27) and its own cited Chainalysis source (March 26) for the Security Council multisig migration; (3) a timeline entry dated April 2, 2026 claiming five named firms published forensic analyses that day, when the cited source (The Record) names none of them and at least one (BlockSec) published two days later, while Drift's suspension itself happened April 1, not April 2; (4) several passages present paraphrases in quotation marks as if verbatim (the Hypernative oracle quote, the BlockSec 'signing stage' quote, and the Nexus Mutual 'DPRK nationals' quote, which in the original reads 'North Korean nationals' and is itself a relay of Drift's own statement); and (5) a few accurate figures (the H7Pi... admin address, the $232 million CCTP bridging figure) that are true per independent sourcing but are not actually supported by any of the sources cited alongside them. No accepted community submissions were present to review. The page also has not been updated to reflect the entity's apparent subsequent rebrand to 'Velocity DEX.'","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}