Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Haruko
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 62 → 62 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464299923
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:50:23.128Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:50:44.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:50:44.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FSbs51TTjoFbVXzXfHfZT8fFbu2ZwakZj6nWTmtQFbQU
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1845 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"d540fb417f41da35d77a28058caa49e7","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:50:22.866Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.5,"investigation_id":"e3c2ffbe-d630-4133-ba9e-c7a1013ddc3a","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":62,"page_slug":"haruko","prev_score":62,"reason":"Of 10 claims reviewed, 2 were disputed (claim_findings[1] and [2], the same defect: the page calls the stolen funds 'confirmed' when CoinDesk attributes the loss to unnamed sources) and 3 could not be verified because the reviewer did not fetch the sources (claim_findings[4], [8], [9]). That gives 50%, in the significant band. The core incident facts, funding details and client list were confirmed, and the reviewer's confidence is modest (0.55), so the penalty sits at the lighter end of the band. The page also omits that the post-mortem was still unpublished in early October (omission_findings[0]), and the 'multiple reports' wording on the bare-metal point rests on a single source (claim_findings[3]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"omission_findings[0] is material: the page stops at Sept 18, 2026 and does not say the promised post-mortem was still unpublished on Oct 2, 2026, and that Haruko did not answer questions about the reported fund losses. This is a core part of the incident story. The band is held at significant rather than relaxed, and not pushed to deny because the omission is a staleness issue and not a false claim."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}