Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443513900
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T12:55:30.438Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2z6YP4n4mUq5ZEQ2eY9GB22HFfAb7nBQ1Nh5a9HQJYTL
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1246 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T12:55:30.316Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"10622728-729b-44eb-90d4-6ea9f25dae1a","new_score":0,"page_slug":"node-gyp-npm-supply-chain-compromise-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core factual scaffolding -- campaign scale (57 packages / 286+ versions), the Phantom Gyp/binding.gyp technique, the critical distinction that the legitimate node-gyp package itself was not backdoored, the Wave 1/Wave 2 timeline, exact package/version numbers, and detailed C2/IoC data -- is corroborated with high precision against directly fetched primary vendor sources (StepSecurity, JFrog, Wiz, Chainguard, Corgea). Weaknesses found were narrower: an hour-level discrepancy in a revocation timestamp, a payload-architecture description that conflicts with one of its own cited sources (ReversingLabs), some persistence-mechanism naming/numeric details not traceable to the cited sources, and one clear timeline date inconsistency where a cited source (Cybersecurity Dive) was published three days before the date the page attributes its reporting to.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}