Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443522948
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T03:05:58.028Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HLnbJLB6i5zDDFRtHbcCVAD4VcgF1YbwofT6qn4xTtzA
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1389 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-27T03:05:57.904Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"cbe21877-b631-47a7-a344-fe90e23b96f0","new_score":18,"page_slug":"bankr-bankrbot-ai-agent-prompt-injection-exploit","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page accurately establishes the core, well-corroborated facts of the May 4, 2026 Bankr/Grok incident -- a genuine prompt injection (attacker-controlled Morse-code text in Grok's public reply was treated by BankrBot as an authenticated command) compounded by an NFT-based privilege-escalation flaw that is properly a distinct 'over-permissioned agent' failure mode, and it appropriately surfaces remediation (Grok-reply disablement, IP whitelisting, reimbursement pledges). Its weakest point is asserting that the second, May 19-20 breach of 14 wallets used 'the same underlying permission-chain vulnerability' as the first, when contemporaneous sources describe that breach's mechanism as unconfirmed and possibly a private-key/session compromise rather than a repeat prompt-injection/NFT chain. A quote attributed to researcher 'Vadim' is accurate but not found in any of the three sources cited alongside it, and the DRB price-decline figure (15-20%) understates the ~40% decline reported elsewhere.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}