Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Knaken Exchange
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 26 → 26 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462188380
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:25:46.134Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:26:09.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:26:09.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- uJzC9tzDWyxnjMoq1bSf4Boo8fwhvdCg44PxuY3ftEa
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1990 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"a8d2510a250c50abdae26403749d0c55","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:25:45.761Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2727,"investigation_id":"d90a08b3-90c5-412d-b225-24bb018fb798","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"knaken-exchange","prev_score":26,"reason":"Of 11 checked claims, 1 was disputed and 2 could not be verified (not found), giving 3 of 11 or about 27%. The core facts are well supported: the 29 June FIOD raid, the 16 July bankruptcy ruling, the appointment of trustee Hamm, and the court quote. The main problem is the timeline entry (claim_findings[3]), which states as fact that the AFM rejected the licence. The cited NL Times source says only that the licence was not obtained. The roughly 7 million euro shortfall is also stated in the summary as established, though it is the prosecutors' allegation and other reporting gives 5 to 5.5 million (claim_findings[6]). The page also lacks the August asset sale and the trustee's claimant estimate, and the reviewer flagged a high-priority gap for a primary AFM source.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The two material omissions (the August 2026 sale of remaining crypto for about 2.2 million euro, and the trustee's estimate of about 6,300 claimants) are developments after the page's late-July cut-off. The page already states the bankruptcy and shutdown, and the reviewer found no contradiction (subject_status.contradicts_page is false). They call for an update, not a harsher band. The weight of the omissions is reflected by placing the penalty in the upper half of the minor band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}