Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Berally
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 41 → 41 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464376168
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T05:22:55.568Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T05:23:06.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T05:23:06.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- PLfw8HVGkQDpFWP6WyUWgj9st2oJdJNKatvZpjYgafb
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1523 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"648df561750c8a8a018e33a1201d9df0","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:22:55.318Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4,"investigation_id":"9c44b38b-7ccf-428b-a435-2889f25d7b0a","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":41,"page_slug":"berally","prev_score":41,"reason":"The core incident (deployer key leak, vesting dump, Smokey's warning, the 'skill issue' reply, and the trading halt) was confirmed by readable sources (claim_findings[0], [5], [6], [8]). However, 6 of 15 checked claims (40%) could not be verified, including the 120% compensation plan and exchange-based attacker identification (claim_findings[3]), the residual-permissions detail (claim_findings[4]), the March 19 all-time low (claim_findings[7]), and the unsourced ZachXBT reference (claim_findings[12]). The summary also presents the roughly $90,000 loss as fact when it is only a community estimate (claim_findings[2]), the FDV figure is stale (claim_findings[9]), and every timeline entry lacks a source. The penalty is set at the lower end of the band because nothing was found to be contradicted, the reviewer's confidence is low, and many failures stem from unreadable sources.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}