Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Cardano
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 32 → 27 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426277737
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-13T21:10:13.970Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8Zoh2CfowmTjPzB6f1fhwnh2jWMgWU4wBWFfXXAoNS8T
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1171 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-13T21:10:13.778Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"2710aef3-f667-49c3-8269-573b46ce6af9","new_score":27,"page_slug":"cardano","prev_score":32,"reason":"The page's core factual record is sound — 9 of 15 claims are fully confirmed, zero are disputed by credible counter-sources, and the disputed_pct of 7% falls within the approve band. However, two concrete errors push the verdict to revise: claim_findings[13] places the Eternl Desktop phishing campaign in January 2025 when the cited source dates it to late December 2025 / early January 2026 (an off-by-one-year misdating), and claim_findings[9] applies a URL that resolves to a March 2026 article as the citation for a separate April 2024 App Store incident, leaving that timeline entry unsourced. Additionally, two high-priority coverage gaps — all six body sections are empty and no on-chain data is cited for any traceable incident — limit the page's utility and warrant expansion before it can be considered complete.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}