Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Shelbit Exchange
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
20 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443518121
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T22:49:34.100Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
Cf1vwUreWVbnDkqtMvK42t7JF22DDZ5UT6zGFN8swgHL
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2522 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:49:33.943Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"4b1608f0-b1d0-41e6-893f-f4656b6af442","new_score":0,"page_slug":"shelbit-exchange","prev_score":2,"reason":"Recomputing from the reviewer's own claim-by-claim data (21 confirmed, 4 partially supported, 2 disputed, 1 unverifiable out of 28 claims), disputed_pct works out to (2+1)/28 = 10.7%, which sits just above the 10% line and places this page in the minor-revision band rather than the approve band. The core facts of the case are solid: the OFAC designation, the VARA fines, the $4B flow figure, and the named individuals' convictions and denials are all confirmed against primary sources (claim_findings[0-2], [4-7], [9-10], [13], [16], [18-27]). But two claims were affirmatively disputed against OFAC's own listing and the page's own text: the page states Shelbit and Kayvanpour were sanctioned under both E.O. 13224 and E.O. 13902, when OFAC's listing applies 13902 only to the separately designated Aban Tether network (claim_findings[3]) — on a sanctions page, naming the wrong legal authority misstates what the designation covers and who else it could reach. Separately, the page contradicts itself about when $540 million in Binance-bound flows occurred, attributing the same figure first to the period after a January 2025 cease-and-desist and then to after a July 2026 enforcement action (claim_findings[15]). Beyond the disputed count, the reviewer also flagged real but lower-severity quality issues that the disputed_pct metric doesn't capture: an internal conflict between a 'tens of millions' figure and a $250M figure for the same gambling-network flows (claim_findings[11]), a $4B TRM Labs attribution that omits TRM's own larger $6.3B same-day total (claim_findings[8]), and quoted claims of direct IRGC control that omit Reuters' own stated inability to confirm IRGC control (claim_findings[12]). None of the five coverage gaps are marked high priority, and a targeted check for the unsourced secondary-sanctions-screening claim found on the related Aban Tether page confirmed it does not appear here, so this is not a case of an error propagating across pages. Taken together, the page's central allegations hold up, but it needs correction on the legal authority claim and internal date consistency before it should be considered fully validated.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}