Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:10:13.632Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"ab0f6bf4-0424-45be-a184-3257859bdf43","new_score":14,"page_slug":"loopring-dex-trustless-exit-disabled-at-shutdown","prev_score":22,"reason":"The page's central allegation — that Loopring's team disabled the protocol's trustless Merkle-proof exit at shutdown and replaced it with a whitelist-only, team-controlled withdrawal path — is confirmed by the team's own quoted statements and by L2Beat's independent technical documentation (claim_findings[4], [5], [13], [16]). Two narrower claims that a specific named multisig executed that shutdown transaction are inferential rather than directly documented and were correctly downgraded to partially_supported (claim_findings[17], [46]), so that piece of the page's framing is more confident than the evidence supports. The review also surfaced two disputed claims unrelated to the core allegation — an internal price-arithmetic error where a stated 'further decline' to $0.012 is actually higher than the page's own prior $0.01 figure (claim_findings[24]), and a miscount of L2Beat's Stage-1 blockers as 'two' when L2Beat lists three (claim_findings[43]) — plus a quote that splits one continuous community comment into two apparently independent ones (claim_findings[49]) and a true claim supported by sources other than the three the page actually cites (claim_findings[33]). None of these push disputed_pct (4.8%) out of the approve range on their own, but two coverage gaps rated high priority — missing on-chain verification of the shutdown transaction and the multisig's role, and no quantification of how many users or how much value the sub-$10 exclusion affects — go to the credibility of the page's core technical and impact claims and warrant revision rather than approval as-is.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}