Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 22 → 22 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443505324
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-08T02:03:48.693Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HHqdZKdewcjBs4Ae3Nr3iXDm6BvAiHYqf3d4WcmegLMm
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1371 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-08T02:03:48.633Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"faec5800-9619-42f7-95f7-64b6ca22289d","new_score":22,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-solana-flash-loan-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":22,"reason":"The investigation is broadly well-sourced and factually accurate on core claims: the $1.65M exploit amount, flash loan source (Kamino, $1.12M USDC), attack mechanism, attacker wallet addresses, fund routing through privacy protocols, the 2023 BNB Chain precedent, the single-pool fix gap on Solana, the CCTP/LayerZero relaunch, and the postmortem date are all confirmed by multiple credible sources. Two issues reduce confidence: (1) the 2023 postmortem quote is presented as verbatim but is a paraphrase — the actual postmortem language differs; and (2) the 2023 exploit total ($573K) is supported by secondary on-chain analyses but conflicts with the official Allbridge postmortem figure of '$650K,' likely because the postmortem aggregates multiple attack phases. The $2M 2022 fundraise claim slightly overstates specificity by characterizing it as 'specifically to fund security audits.' One source (StartupFortune) returned 403, potentially link rot, though an archive URL exists.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}