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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · TrueBit Oracle Exploit (January 2026)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457979949
Off-chain at
2026-10-17T09:03:15.879Z
Anchored at
2026-10-17T09:03:24.479Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
A7brA8vSWMLk8PX4ZwqxkjEw6VGsymQiiSpSmSXuUVyr
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2126 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"8ddaeb56376f5c3c5e555f759fc3f670","decided_at":"2026-10-17T09:03:15.695Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.05,"findings_hash":"EEUvGquaqwh3X6q2Mx14tV6pERjd12TtdJ6F8T3on3bP","investigation_id":"19a3fa1c-c5f0-4541-8433-c1d8a05d9807","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"4ea5b9d6f36f42ae9b1312ea06015a69f2f1ef0b8a2a05e0cfb09e8887d4217d","page_slug":"truebit-oracle-exploit-january-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative is well supported: the January 8, 2026 exploit mechanics, addresses, transaction hash, ETH amount (8,535 ETH, ~$26.2-26.6M), Tornado Cash laundering timeline, and the PeckShield-attributed Sparkle Protocol link all check out against independently fetched primary and secondary sources (CoinDesk, Rekt, CertiK, DL News, Cantina/QuillAudits/SlowMist synthesis). The entity-disambiguation section is accurate and appropriately cautious about the relationship between the original Truebit protocol and 'Truebit Verify.' The most significant problems are sourcing-level rather than factual: one timeline entry cites a CoinDesk article for the Sparkle Protocol connection that does not mention Sparkle at all (the fact is true but should be attributed to Rekt); another timeline entry credits both CertiK and PeckShield with making the Sparkle attribution when only PeckShield is reported to have made it; two mentions of a 'broader pattern' of legacy-contract attacks are attributed to Halborn as well as DL News, but Halborn's own post discusses only the Truebit incident in isolation; the cited CoinTelegraph URL returned a 404 on direct fetch; and the secondary attacker's loss is given a narrower dollar range ($250K-$253K) than at least one of the page's own cited sources (DL News, which reports 'just under $300,000'). None of these rise to the level of the page's core claims being wrong, but several citations point to sources that do not actually say what is attributed to them.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}