Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · THORChain GG20 MPC Vault Exploit (May 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 23 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465101664
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-04T00:33:03.803Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-04T00:33:23.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-04T00:33:23.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EbVdEBD5486SX9p3HqDjsrH6evxsWevfXk3bakKCWkbv
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1608 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"8cdc450867044e99c3398effd2dc130f","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T00:33:03.522Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.375,"investigation_id":"4f885635-d130-4b30-975b-91055a2292bd","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":23,"page_slug":"thorchain-gg20-mpc-vault-exploit-may-2026","prev_score":38,"reason":"Of 8 claims checked, 2 were disputed (claim_findings[0] and [1], the exploit report date given as May 21 where the official post says May 20) and 1 could not be verified (claim_findings[7], the TRM Labs cumulative-loss figure), giving 3 of 8 (37.5%), which falls in the 30-60% band. Both disputed findings are one date error repeated in the summary and the timeline, and the core incident facts (node join, bond size, loss, halt behaviour, restart date) were confirmed against the official report, so the penalty is set at the mildest end of the band. Two further claims, the '20% of vault funds' share and the 'third major incident' count, were only partially supported, and the reviewer's confidence was low (0.5), so this is a revision rather than a denial. No omissions were found and the subject's status matches the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":-15,"score_limit":{"applied":-15,"limited":false,"proposed":-15,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-15},"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}