Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 4 → 4 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457960297
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T07:52:00.696Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T07:52:21.299Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5YimzU6hnr5BF6aJxgb3tEvFt5H9AgtaAoHvHpAfXN6S
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1833 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"3d318c5408eb34fe9617db35c5a89c07","decided_at":"2026-10-17T07:52:00.474Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0526,"findings_hash":"SZMaiRpoi31zbwc5fPwzHGbg912zRRuN4rE2ob1spro","investigation_id":"f7e8927f-c246-405f-843b-763fbb6ec79e","mode":"findings_only","new_score":4,"page_content_hash":"1cbba776cafd1fb34ed1402e17fe66e2a775e17a28e11b0976b41312afc32f06","page_slug":"balance-coin-blc-oracle-manipulation-42dao","prev_score":4,"reason":"The page's central narrative — a July 22, 2026 oracle manipulation exploit draining roughly $912K-$915K from 42DAO's Balance Protocol via the Spotter/Dog/GemJoin modules, executed twice about two hours apart with no circuit breaker, collapsing BLC over 99% from its peg, followed by team silence — is well corroborated across numerous independent outlets (CryptoTimes, Cryptopolitan, Blockonomi, TFTC, KuCoin) and directly confirmed against the live CertiK Skynet audit page for the January 27, 2025 audit details. The rug-pull-allegation section is appropriately hedged. Two defects were found: a repeated, grouped mischaracterization describing the CertiK-audited files as 'the BLC Minting smart contract' when the actual audited files are Custodian.sol and Exchange.sol (the 'BLC Minting' name only exists in the GitHub repo name), appearing in three places; and two link-rot issues (a mismatched Blockonomi archive_url pointing to an unrelated Movement Labs article, and a dead 42DAO GitBook URL for which a correct archive snapshot is already on file). One specific figure, the post-crash market cap of '$12,000,' could not be independently verified. No accepted community submissions existed to review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}