Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · StablR
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 5 → 0 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423950662
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-03T04:04:20.316Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6htVk7vrqSei9d5WLo7YJQ3hAkkT6sJN3EE1zd9DEZV9
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1812 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-03T04:04:19.368Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"67c1f560-0143-47ba-8309-7ce127131ff6","new_score":0,"page_slug":"stablr","prev_score":5,"reason":"The page's core exploit facts — multisig configuration, minted token amounts, attacker net profit, and institutional response — are well-confirmed by Tier 1-2 sources including CoinDesk, The Block, and Blockaid. The reviewer's 12% disputed/unverifiable rate is driven by peripheral issues rather than central allegations. The most material corrections needed are: (1) claim_findings[25] incorrectly labels Corne van der Meijden as 'co-founder' when StablR's own About Us page lists him as Chief Risk and Operations Officer — this characterization is sourced only from a credibility-3 FinTelegram source; (2) claim_findings[29] states the Payvision criminal complaint was filed in 2020 but the EFRI source document is dated August 2021; (3) claim_findings[11], [16], and [17] all rely on a single dead CoinReporter URL (HTTP 404), leaving two tertiary attacker addresses, a precise ZachXBT follow-up timestamp, and the 'StablR team appeared inactive' characterization without live sourcing; and (4) extreme depeg price lows in claim_findings[12] and [13] — USDR at $0.40 and EURR at $0.548 — are presented alongside sustained depeg levels without distinguishing momentary candle lows from prolonged levels, and the $0.40 figure is not confirmed by any directly fetched primary source. Three high-priority coverage gaps (on-chain fund-flow trace, MFSA post-incident enforcement status, and reserve restoration roadmap) are open but do not by themselves warrant denial.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}