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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
8 → 8 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443511065
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T03:21:17.909Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
6XPLDTdqhBSKsSzMPZViVi7ZLCa7uo2Ab41cR2KBnL6M
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1799 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T03:21:17.616Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"7be2e44e-2114-4940-85f3-54a8b6b1cd26","new_score":8,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-cctp-base-chain-exploit-august-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"Of 40 claims checked, none were disputed, 33 were confirmed outright, and the remaining 7 involved only minor imprecision or interpretive framing rather than substantive errors. The page's central allegation — the August 19, 2026 CCTP exploit that drained 191,156 USDC from Allbridge's Base router — is confirmed and, per claim_findings[1], independently corroborated in its key figures and mechanism by a SlowMist analysis the page itself does not cite; this is a sourcing gap (also flagged in coverage_gaps) rather than a factual problem, since the uncited source agrees with what the page says. The page's 'novel attack class' framing (claim_findings[3]) is reasonably flagged as the page's own interpretive characterization rather than a directly sourced fact, and the cited precedent (Noble mint bug) is thematically similar but not mechanistically identical — a soft overstatement, not a misrepresentation, and not weighty enough to affect the verdict. The remaining partially-supported items (claim_findings[25, 28, 34, 38]) are small numerical rounding differences (a $650,000 vs. confirmed ~$570,000 loss estimate, '39 months' vs. ~40, '30 minutes' vs. ~25) or a slightly overstated summary of L2BEAT's contract-verification language, none touching the core narrative. No coverage gap was rated high priority, and reviewer confidence (0.8) was solid, supporting a clean approval with no score penalty.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}