Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · ShipMonk
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 16 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515080
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T14:05:38.454Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7URqywFj1r9Dg917tFyuuiASxor6SUKQ7hCe34w3ZW7H
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2065 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T14:05:37.763Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"930d9ec3-3b01-456d-b86e-c788baabbe19","new_score":16,"page_slug":"shipmonk","prev_score":28,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 20 of 24 claims outright and found only 1 disputed and 1 unverifiable, putting disputed_pct at 8.3% — mathematically inside the approve range, and the breach's core facts (the CVE, the 13,689-customer scope, the 90-day retention mitigation, and the parallel Framework/Tally/n8n/Kilo Code disclosures) are solidly confirmed against Trezor's own blog and multiple Tier-1 outlets. Two problems keep this out of approval anyway. First, the page's summary — its most-read line — says ShipMonk 'disclosed' the breach, which claim_findings[1] shows is false and contradicted by the page's own body sections and by Tier-1 sources: only Trezor ever made a public statement. A citation for the founding year (claim_findings[0]) also points to a CBInsights page that states a different year than the one claimed. Second, and more consequential, the reviewer flagged a high-priority coverage gap: ShipMonk is a non-crypto logistics company caught up in a broad, unrelated Metabase zero-day that hit several other unrelated companies too, and no source establishes any fault or misconduct on ShipMonk's part, yet the page's 'vendor risk management' section (claim_findings[22]) frames open questions in a way that risks implying an unproven governance failure. That is an aggregate framing problem, not a false-statement problem, and it is not something a disputed-claims percentage can measure — it requires the page to add plain, prominent context that ShipMonk itself is not a crypto business and is included solely as a third-party vendor, not because any source found it at fault. This revision request addresses correctable defects; it is not a judgment on whether ShipMonk should be indexed at all.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}