Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Drop (dropdotmoney)
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 39 → 39 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462172747
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T18:30:38.246Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T18:30:48.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T18:30:48.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- HsXNu6BGTg98P6qFRmRbJ47i2geoB4DBBkd7GeuvPvmF
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1806 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"d2481b9c712b4d43958c5f7fba755520","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T18:30:37.940Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1111,"investigation_id":"e8934d6b-a58c-45e5-8f7d-e26de14415a6","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":39,"page_slug":"drop-dropdotmoney","prev_score":39,"reason":"Of 10 claim findings, 1 was left out as source_blocked (claim_findings[8], the seed round), leaving 9. One of those (claim_findings[2], the per-asset loss breakdown) could not be found in the sources checked, so about 11% is disputed or unverifiable. The core facts hold: the September 22, 2026 exploit, Drop's roughly $4.4M loss, the Cosmos Hub halt, and the 1.227M ATOM moved. The main defect is claim_findings[5] and [6], which describe the Cosmos Hub refund proposal as already rejected when the cited articles were written mid-vote. The page also omits which Drop contracts were affected, which matters for dATOM redemption.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":9,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a material omission (the page does not say which Drop contracts were compromised, including the dATOM converter and withdrawal manager, which bears on dATOM redemption) and a high-priority coverage gap on Drop's own post-incident status. The percentage band (minor) is kept, not raised, because the omission source is a search summary and the subject_status does not contradict the page."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}