Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Bitget
- Sequence
- #7
- Score
- 33 → 21 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 450200288
- Off-chain at
- 2026-09-25T01:10:12.227Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8jJDy98TFVDENRqiskG2v1yWb7HYnjsna1PZqPaUZXF7
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1536 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"9e55fd9c78199b38bd7f2f7eebc49355","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-09-25T01:10:11.689Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.16,"investigation_id":"1297716a-0f85-4f49-905d-8e9cddae14b8","new_score":21,"page_slug":"bitget","prev_score":33,"reason":"Of the 25 individual claims checked, 21 were confirmed as accurate, 4 were disputed, and 1 was found stale. The page's central, trust-score-driving claim — the September 24, 2026 $351.6 million hack and the surrounding regulatory, security-history, and listing-dispute record — held up under review (claim_findings[0-8], [10-11], [13-21]). Four issues need correction: the France section presents 2023/2024 AMF warnings as current status without disclosing that Bitget fully exited the French market by March 31, 2026 (claim_findings[9], stale, tied to a high-priority coverage gap); a timeline date for the Singapore MAS suspension is off by several months (claim_findings[12]); the page understates how negative Bitget's current Trustpilot rating is (claim_findings[22]); and a Gracy Chen/Hyperliquid dispute is misdated by a full year in both the prose and the timeline (claim_findings[23-24]). None of these touch the page's core allegations, but the France staleness issue sits on a section the page itself marks 'high' severity and should be corrected promptly.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}